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BRIDGING THE CONCEPTS OF BUREAUCRACY AND POPULAR
GOVERNMENT: THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN STUART MILL

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Graduate Faculty of The University of Akron

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Beth Kinsley Warner

August, 1999

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
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Dissertation *L*


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ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that John Stuart Mill's theory of government can contribute a viable theoretical framework for discussion about the role of bureaucracy within the American political system for the field of public administration. In this study I developed a conceptual and analytical framework using concepts of bureaucracy and popular government from public administration literature, current theories and treatments of the role of public administration in popular government. Then, I laid out Mill's theory of government examining his writings on democracy, representative government, and his structure for governance. Next, I critically analyzed his work for its ability to bridge and integrate 1) the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government, and 2) to contribute to the current public administration dialogue concerning the role of bureaucracy within the American political system.

I argue that Mill's work can be applied to American government in a way that suggests a place for public bureaucracy that is necessary for good government. Mill's theory of government bridges the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government in a way that utilizes the best characteristics of each. His writings contain remarkable references to the concerns addressed in current theories of public administration. Finally, to complete my argument that Mill's work is an important historical and foundational resource for the current concerns of public administration, I devised a model of government from Mill's work that recognizes the unique role of public bureaucracy as an educative and constitutive institution within the American political and cultural system.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Study

This dissertation argues that John Stuart Mill's theory of government can contribute a viable theoretical framework for discussion about the role of bureaucracy within the American political system for the field of public administration. The issue of the role of bureaucracy within popular government has been a central concern of American public administration since its inception, and it continues to be central in important dialogue today.

At the heart of the dilemmas of contemporary public administration is the question of the relationship between bureaucracy and popular government. What is the role of bureaucracy, an organization of skill and expertise, within a popular government commonly referred to as some variation on democracy? The literature bearing on this concern is extensive. In a sense, much of the literature of public administration is relevant to the concern: Wilson (1887), *The Study of Administration*; Goodnow (1900), *Politics and Administration*; Appleby (1949), *Government is Different*; Hyneman (1950), *Bureaucracy in a Democracy*; Redford (1969),

Democracy in the Administrative State; Waldo (1984), *The Administrative State; The Intellectual Crisis of Public Administration* (Ostrom, 1973), *Toward a New Public Administration* (Marini, 1971), Mosher (1982), *Democracy and the Public Service; Refounding Public Administration* (Wamsley, et. al., 1990) and the debates and sprouts it has stimulated, *Refounding Democratic Public Administration* (Wamsley & Wolf, 1996) and *Bureaucracy and Self-Government* (Cook, 1996), *Government Is Us* (King & Stivers, et. al, 1998)--to cite only a few. This literature reflects the centrality of the question about the relationship between bureaucracy and popular government.

The particularly American struggle to balance popular government with administration has been with us since the beginning of the state. The founders of the American Constitution relied on their knowledge of political theory and philosophy as well as their actual experience with political and administrative institutions to develop their own views of the potential of this new state (Beach, et.al., 1997; Sabine, 1973). Currently, much of the literature in public administration has looked to the historical beginnings of public administration in the United States to find normative grounding, political wisdom, and tacit knowledge to support its legitimate place in the political system. Reaching as far back as the time

of the colonies, leading up to the Revolutionary War and following, step by step, the formation of the American state, this literature shows that, indeed, the role of administration in the American political system has always been a critical one, and often has been the reason for uprising and change (McSwite, 1997; Cook, 1996; Fishkin, 1995; Chandler, 1990; Morone, 1990; Marini & Pugh, 1981).

The evolution of the field of public administration has been intimately involved with the evolution of American politics and its legitimacy seems to lie in the fact of its obvious, yet taken for granted, existence. Discussions about whether public administration is legitimate simply because it exists or because it is necessary continue to arise because the tension between bureaucracy and popular government has not been reconciled. What the founders meant or how they should be interpreted, what powers are distributed by the Constitution and how that translates into the role bureaucracy should play in popular government begin to touch on the real question of bureaucracy's role in a popular government (See the discussion among Warren, Spicer & Terry, Lowi, Rohr, Stivers, Wise, 1993).

Still, today, the search for legitimacy for public administration continues to be fueled by negative attitudes on the part of the general citizenry toward bureaucracy, its real, or imagined abuse of power, its interference in

the daily lives of citizens and the lack of meaningful access to public processes for citizens (King & Stivers, 1998; Wamsley, et.al., 1990).

Citizen distrust of government and the beneficial role public administration can play in re-linking citizens to government has been a frequent topic in recent literature. Topics like citizenship, civic capacity, and community governance all relate to perceptions of citizen distrust of government and public administration's unique role in repairing the relationship (Leip, 1999; Simo, 1999; Clapp, Imig and Reilly, 1999; Kass, 1999; Heying, 1999; Morgan and Vizzini, 1999; Melkers and Thomas, 1998; King, Felty, Susel, 1998; King and Stivers, 1998; Box, 1998; Wamsley and Wolf, 1996, Terry, 1995). The effort public administration writers have made to establish not only the legitimacy of public administration, but the constitutive role the institution has played and can continue to play in the American political system demonstrates the importance of reconciling bureaucracy and popular government into a workable relationship.

Contribution Of The Study

Public administration scholars lament the lack of an adequate theoretical base that can be used to reconcile or explain this relationship (Wamsley, 1996; Stivers,

1990). Finding an adequate theoretical base requires that public administration be examined in its context as part of a political system. Waldo (1984) argued that public administration contained elements of a political theory. In his analysis of public administration, Waldo examined the profession as it related to the American political philosophy. Based on his example, in this study I assume that an adequate theoretical base for public administration will reflect a balance between bureaucracy, an organization of skill and expertise, and popular government in a form that recognizes the values of the American political, social, and cultural system.

The most commonly called upon essay of bureaucracy for American public administration is that of German Sociologist Max Weber. Weber references bureaucracy in scattered places throughout the two volumes of his work but they are sometimes presented or considered as though they were a theory of public bureaucracy. Weber never defined bureaucracy nor did he write a succinct description or analysis of the relationship of the concepts of popular government and bureaucracy (Albrow, 1970). Hummel (1994) notes that Weber's bureaucracy is a reference to all modern organizations that are based on the rational principles of modernity.

American public administration writers often criticize the Weberian type bureaucracy (Goodsell, 1994). The criticism includes negative references to the large hierarchical form of organization that seems to collect dangerous political power and suppress individual personality and human relationships. Focusing on Weber's descriptions of a powerful and potentially abusive bureaucracy have supported outright rejection of the organization type as a threat to popular government. Solutions to this threat include attempts to make bureaucracy more democratic either through democratic management practices, the inclusion of citizens in decision processes or recognizing the potential for bureaucratic organizations to represent a diverse population.

Interestingly, Weber's writings were virtually unknown in American public administration (and in American social science generally) until after the Second World War, although the advent of Woodrow Wilson's essay has been considered to be the beginning of a self-conscious discipline of public administration. Scholars have shown that the issue of bureaucracy has been critically relevant to the United States since the Colonial times leading up to the Revolutionary War (Cook, 1996; Kass, 1990; Morone, 1990; Marini & Pugh, 1981), through the period under the Articles of Confederation (Chandler, 1990) in the Critical

Period (Beach et. al., 1997), and the Constitutional period (Spicer and Terry, 1993; Rohr, 1986; 1990), all occurring before Weber's work was written and long before it was translated into English.

There is an irony in the fact that over the last half-century American scholars with an interest in the issues of bureaucracy within popular government have frequently selected their starting point with Weber's work. The irony is that prior to Weber's writings, John Stuart Mill set out a remarkably succinct yet impressively comprehensive theory of bureaucracy within popular government, articulated in the English language, with clear reference to Anglo-American type political institutions, and with explicit and clear reference to the kinds of issues which have been most germane to the American public administration discussion.

Mill recognized the dangers of bureaucracy including the potential abuse of power and the limitations it placed on human creativity. But, he also recognized that bureaucracy had many benefits for popular government. He, like Woodrow Wilson, believed there were things to be learned from European bureaucracy that could be incorporated into popular government. Wilson planned to "Americanize" bureaucracy insisting that it "inhale much free American air" (1941, 486). Similarly, Mill worked out

a relationship between a distinctly European bureaucracy and an Anglo-type popular government that would take advantage of the best qualities of each.

This dissertation argues that the work of John Stuart Mill can be applied to American government in a way that will suggest a place for public bureaucracy that is not only legitimate, but actually necessary for good government. Mill's theory of government bridges the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government in a way that utilizes the best characteristics of each. Mill's writings contain remarkable references to the concerns addressed in current theories of public administration. His work can be used to create a bridge for discussion among competing theories and can provide a broader scope of discussion that can lead to the development of a comprehensive, balanced and integrated public administration theory.

Mill's arguments about bureaucracy and popular government warn about the dangers of "democracy" as some of our founders did, but emphasize the importance of the participation of the individual in self-government. Mill balanced the spirit of popular government with governance by the most educated, skilled and experienced of the nation, whether they were citizens, elected representatives or administrative officials.

John Stuart Mill has been neglected, misinterpreted, and generally not looked to as a source for American public administration theory. Mill's theory of bureaucracy within representative government is an important theoretical source for contemporary public administration dialogue. Mill's ability to bridge the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government, if examined earlier in the development of American public administration, may have supplied a normative base that would have guided the field toward a more stable grounding in this unique form of popular government.

From the beginning of what is called self-conscious public administration, Woodrow Wilson directed us toward the European model of administration because he believed that authoritarian governments had, by necessity, done more to develop a workable system than had popular government (1941). Wilson directed us away from British literature on administration because, he said, as a popular government, England had the same difficulty we had, striving for popular sovereignty, but falling down in the area of administration. Wilson believed that popular governments like the United States and England had been more concerned with creating a constitution than running one.

Perhaps, because England had the same difficulty striving for a skilled public administration that would

enhance popular sovereignty, we should look to the theories and ideas that were generated there. Mill addressed the issue of bureaucracy in popular government by looking at the same issues that are most important to American public administration today. Legitimacy, responsibility and accountability, the public interest, citizen participation, individual freedom and other issues are grounded in the relationship of the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government. The relationship of these concepts reaches the core of the debate about the role of bureaucracy in the American political system. Thus, an investigation of Mill's ideas will further inform the debate about the role of bureaucracy within popular government.

Method Of Investigation

In this study I will first develop a conceptual and analytical framework using concepts of bureaucracy and popular government from public administration literature. Then, I will lay out Mill's theory of government examining his writings on democracy, representative government, and his structure for governance. Next, I will critically analyze the work for its ability to bridge and integrate 1) the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government, and 2) to contribute to the current public administration dialogue concerning the role of bureaucracy within the American

political system. I will demonstrate how Mill's theory provides a bridge for discussion among competing theories of public administration and can lead to the development of a comprehensive, balanced, and integrated public administration theory.

Analytical theorizing has relevance today as seen in the continual review and interpretation of past ideas and theories for their application to the current era. Some familiar names referred to in various pieces of public administration literature called upon to shed light on current issues are Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Locke, Rousseau, and Tocqueville. Other theorists include Hayek, Burke and David Hume. Even the postmodernists look backward to ideas of people like Nietzsche.

The history and interpretation of ideas and theorizing are ongoing enterprises that date back to the original political and historical philosophers. Sheldon Wolin argued for the revival of "political wisdom" (1969, 1070) or traditional political theory because tacit political knowledge, he said, is rooted in knowledge of the past and in the tradition of theory. Tacit political knowledge accrues over time, demands reflection, and is based on a complex framework of knowledge calling on diverse resources. Similarly, C. Wright Mills (1959), in his *Sociological Imagination*, said that in any study of

historical texts, the historical trend links us with the writer of the text and provides common experiences that enable us to engage the work, understanding its meanings and consequences for today's society; a dialogical process in which the two historical positions are fused together.

The history of ideas and the practice of analytical theory, together, compare the interaction of ideas and institutions in one culture with ideas and institutions of another culture. Historical theory, subjected to critical appraisal, helps us to see value systems tested in terms of our own moral and political experience (Sibley, 1961). The study of ideas is an integral part of the way in which we attempt to understand our current experience. Combining ideas of the past with current experience gives theory a dual purpose: understanding and guiding action.

The relationship of bureaucracy and popular government has both understanding and action implications in American public administration. It is from experience or practice that questions arise concerning the "right" or "wrong" ways to act. Recognizing the gap between professions of "democratic" values and the realities of political experience which seemed to deny those values, students of public administration, whether theorists or practitioners or both, have tried to reconcile professed values with political realities.

The formulation and re-formulation of value systems takes place in social institutions. The theorist looks at social and cultural values in the context of public institutions and problems (Sibley, 1961). The history of public administration has been one of reform. Reform is dependent on those who are concerned by gaps between values and practices. The theorist reinforces and stimulates value and action questions by continual re-examination of propositions of social and cultural values as they are related to the empirical world.

Bridging theorists and theories of the past with problems and questions of today is an enterprise common to public administration. This is demonstrated by the current literature reviving past theorists for re-examination, for example, those who have recently turned to Edmund Burke (Haque and Spicer, 1997; Terry, 1997; Morone, 1990) or those debating the historical foundations of American political ideas (Cook, 1996; Marini, 1994; Spicer & Terry, 1993; Chandler, 1990; Rohr, 1986) or calling for a new theory or theories of public administration (Wamsley, 1996; Geuras & Garofolo, 1996; Fox & Miller, 1995; Terry, 1995; Harmon, 1995).

Some scholars argue that public administration continues to operate without an adequate theory base. Stivers (1990) suggests that the term normative theory, in

public administration, is an oxymoron. Gary Wamsley noted his dismay when he referred to a book he co-authored in the beginning of his academic career where he expressed the need for a theory of public administration (Wamsley & Wolf; 1996, 351). Wamsley, in 1996, noting the continued inadequacy of normative theory in the field, calls for theorizing to continue in public administration.

Larry Terry (1995), finding a deficit in leadership theories for bureaucracy, used historic conceptions of public administration to formulate a role of conservator for the administrator. Kass (1990) has revived agency theory to fill a void with a normative social theory and to advance the role of steward for the public administrator. Agency theory was also prominent in the Blacksburg group's treatment of the theoretical needs of public administration (Wamsley, et.al., 1990). The scholars in the field are still searching for a normative, legitimizing basis for bureaucracy in popular government and have increasingly turned to the revival of traditional theory to bring a supportive foundation to public administration. John Stuart Mill's theory of government can contribute a supportive foundation to current American public administration.

I have chosen analytical theorizing to show the relevance of Mill's work to current public administration

dialogue. Analytical theory can be defined as the disciplined investigation of problems considered along side the practices and institutions with which they are associated (Sabine, 1973). Theories and institutions are a part of culture and reflect the historical evolution of thought handed down from past philosophers. This historical thought analyzed and evaluated, then acted on, becomes a part of the nature of institutions and generations are connected by the association.

Taking this analytical theoretical approach, the disciplined investigation of Mill's theory in historical context can be applied to the problems and practice of today's institution of public administration. Following this theoretical tradition Mill's theory of government will be examined and analyzed by applying a conceptual framework for bureaucracy and popular government drawn from current public administration literature. This framework connects the past with the present looking for political wisdom and consequences for today's society.

Limitations Of The Study

This study is limited by the scope of the investigation to presenting Mill's work and analyzing it according to the conceptual framework. The study is meant to suggest another theoretical source for public

administration dialogue that can contribute to the understanding of the relationship between bureaucracy and popular government. Although some observations and implications of Mill's work to current public administration practice issues have been offered, no attempt has been made to translate Mill's theory to actual practice principles, methods, or solutions.

Mill's work can be a useful and usable framework to bridge the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government for current public administration theory. However, it is important to recognize that Mill's work, written for a specific time and place, 138 years ago, has some application limitations. These limitations are discussed in Chapter 7 after Mill's theory has been presented.

Organization Of The Dissertation

Within the context of analytical theory, this study proceeds by first by developing a conceptual and analytical framework with which to bridge the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government as well as for creating a context to argue for the relevance of Mill's work to current public administration theory. In Chapter Two, I look at the particularly American struggle between administration and popular government, revealing that the tension has been present since the beginning of the state and supporting the

need to bridge bureaucracy and popular government in a way that is beneficial to the American state. I review some of the attempts to find the best role for public administration within American government, viewing them through a framework that separates them into two streams of sometimes competing theories. Then, to complete the analytical framework, I briefly examine some of the ways bureaucracy has been described and the different labels given to the American political system, pointing to the difficulty inherent in reconciling the concepts.

Next, I present the elements of Mill's theory. In the Third Chapter, I begin the examination and analysis by looking at Mill's concept of democracy. As we will see, some of the difficulty in finding the role of bureaucracy within popular government is related to the various conceptions of and allegiance to democracy. Democracy has taken a defining place in our social and cultural values. Examining Mill's views on democracy and the formative events of his early life that led to his mature view of government provides some insight into common concerns about democracy that are applicable today.

Mill struggled with Utilitarianism and radical democracy, and carefully examined the observations of democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville. He came to the conclusion that the spread of democracy was inevitable

but, in order for it to be beneficial, its dangers and limitations must be addressed.

In Chapter Four, I explain Mill's choice of representative government, properly administered, as the best form of popular government, in practice as well as theory. Here we begin to see how Mill's theory has similarities to current public administration theories that emphasize the importance of either or both popular participation and competent leadership. Mill develops criteria for building good government as a foundation to evaluate the benefits and boundaries of participation and competence. Representative government, properly administered, ameliorated the dangers and limitations of democracy.

Chapter Five describes how Mill structured his representative government so that it balanced participation and competent leadership. He used a system of governing elites, each with special skills and responsibilities within the political system. Mill characterized their responsibilities as a public trust guided by accountability and publicity. He divided the governing elites into the educated citizen, the wise representative, and the skilled bureaucrat.

In Chapter Six, I explain how Mill planned the relationship among these governing elites and what this

means for the role of public bureaucracy within popular government. Mill joined the different subsets of his polity in an ethical relationship of constitutional morality. This relationship concerned the use of power and works out Mill's emphasis on ability with responsibility and autonomy with accountability. This discussion analyzes the importance of the institutional perspective, also found in current literature, to finding public administration's place in popular government.

Then, Mill provides an example of how competence and participation work together at the local level. Here public bureaucracy emerges as a critical player in an information system where bureaucracy, as an institution, has the unique ability to maintain and use social knowledge that is necessary for good policy decisions made in the public interest.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, to complete my argument that Mill's work is an important historical and foundational resource for the current concerns of public administration, I devise a model of government from Mills work that bridges and integrates the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government by showing the unique role of public bureaucracy within the political system. Reflecting on Mill's political wisdom as it can be applied to current political questions provides an understanding of

our experience that can contribute to a comprehensive,
balanced, and integrated theory of public administration.

CHAPTER II
CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To build the conceptual core of my argument it is necessary to establish the context of the struggle between bureaucracy and popular government within public administration literature. To develop a conceptual and analytical framework with which to bridge the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government as well as for creating a context to argue for the relevance of Mill's work to current public administration theory, I will look at the history of the particularly American struggle between administration and popular government. This examination will reveal the tension that has been present since the beginning of the state. It will support the need to bridge bureaucracy and popular government in a way that is beneficial to the American State.

Next, I will review some of the attempts by public administration scholars to find the best role for public administration within American government, viewing them through a framework that separates them into two streams of sometimes competing theories. Mill gave us a prescription for good government that blended the benefits of popular

sovereignty with competent leadership. Thompson (1976) described this blending as Mill's two principles of government: competence and participation. These two principles provide a useful framework for bridging bureaucracy and popular government. Public administration theory literature can be separated into these two streams of thought. Viewing current public administration theory in this way will enable us to see the contribution Mill can make to the current dialogue.

Then, to complete the analytical framework, I briefly examine public administration literature to see some of the ways bureaucracy has been described and the different labels given to the American political system, pointing to the difficulty inherent in reconciling the concepts.

The Joint Evolution Of American Politics And Public Administration: Tension From The Beginning

The struggle between liberty, popular sovereignty, protecting individuals and preserving rights has been a part of American history since its beginnings. Briefly examining the history of this struggle will demonstrate the need to find a bridge for discussion. This literature shows that the tension is an inherent part of American culture and while we may never resolve the tension, finding a way to balance and integrate its positive aspects into

the American political system may contribute to a better role for public administration.

American public administration was influenced by European civilization during the Colonial and Revolutionary periods, but the primary influence on the colonies was England (Marini & Pugh, 1981). However, Colonial politics differed from England's in its instability. The new society boisterously debated and argued over the state of its social order and its political economy (Morone, 1990). The settlers had no particular experience or knowledge of public administration and it was not seen as a distinct part of government. Administrators were generally officials of the English government and usually associated with the church. But, the settler's notions of proper governance concerned the principles of contract and the consent of the governed as the only legitimate basis for governance. Debates took place over whether the letter of the law was always binding or whether the law should be tempered with the spirit of purpose and equity (Marini & Pugh, 1981).

In the time immediately before the American Revolution, a growing separation from England led to the development of American public administration. The issues against England concerned representation, natural rights, taxation and delegation of authority to local residents.

The colonists objected to the administration and regulation of local affairs by a central authority, so far removed, that it had little knowledge of the impact of the regulations (Morone, 1990; Marini & Pugh, 1981). It has been suggested that if administrative problems could have been dealt with adequately the political consequences may have been different (Marini & Pugh, 1981).

The Revolutionary War, in effect, forged many of the colonies into a more unified, though still disjointed and decentralized entity. The debates after the war were, again, essentially administrative debates. The Declaration of Independence ambiguously referred to tyranny and natural rights that were triggered by issues of taxation, administrative injustice and regulation of commerce (Marini & Pugh, 1981). Operating under state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation, Americans accomplished many things. But by 1780's there was again talk of crisis (Morone, 1990). In response to the abuses of the English administration, Americans vested almost all public power in the assemblies carefully subordinating executive officers to the legislature. Pennsylvania dropped the office of administrator altogether. But, legislative government could not respond to all the desires of all the people. The assemblies sometimes passed and repealed laws to accommodate just one person (Morone, 1990).

The Articles of Confederation did not offer much stability. They were not a central authority, but an association among sovereign states. The national government operated almost without administrative capacity. Chandler (1990) explained that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate in the administration of the law, taxation, trade, the relationships between the states, and in the enforcement of financial obligations. Though some have questioned how these men, experienced in writing state constitutions, could have produced such an inadequate document, Chandler points out that they were negotiating a contract of sovereign states, as separate countries. John Adams explained that Congress under the Articles of Confederation was not a legislative assembly or a representative assembly, but a diplomatic assembly (Chandler, 1990, 440). The inadequacy of the lack of a centralized authority became obvious during the Shays rebellion in 1786. The Department of Treasury, under the Articles of Confederation, was unable to help when farmers in Massachusetts faced debts, delinquent taxes and foreclosures on their property due to an economic downturn. This experience uncovered the need for a stronger central government.

The debates between the Federalist and the anti-Federalists were the principle exchange of ideas leading up

to the Constitution. The Federalists, who were originally called the Nationalists (perhaps a better label for their perspective), argued for a strong national government looking to unite the country and build a strong international force through strengthening the executive and administrative portions of government. They wanted this strong central government to maintain majority rule, minority rights, balanced representation, separation of powers, and checks and balances (Chandler, 1990). The original Federalists, now called the anti-Federalists, who were supporters of the Articles of Confederation, argued to maintain a loose confederation of fairly autonomous states retaining their own governing powers. The Federalists won the debate and since the ratification of the American Constitution, public administration has been profoundly influenced by the move toward national, centralized American politics. A synthesis of ideas was achieved in a more energetic administrative design, but the tension was not resolved (Morone, 1990). The tension between the Federalists and anti-Federalist arose again in Hamilton and Jefferson's discussions about how to administer the new state.

Jefferson's arguments reflected part of the anti-Federalist position that called for greater autonomy of local and state governments. Jefferson thought that

citizens could more easily participate in decisions affecting their lives. Hamilton proposed a national bank, greater centralization of policy making, and strengthening the executive branch of the national government.

Hamilton's arguments won out because of the growth of the national economy and developments that led to a stronger national government, including its administrative responsibilities. Eventually, Jefferson believed that a stronger national government and executive branch was necessary to the future of the country (Marini & Pugh, 1981). Still, Jefferson's arguments for democracy have had a great influence on public administration as seen in the calls for participatory democracy, smaller national government and stronger state and local government, and the tension between bureaucracy and democracy (Morone, 1990). Hamilton's carefully reasoned arguments have taken a back seat to Jefferson's in history. Jefferson's words, referred to in many discussions about government, played a large role in convincing an increasingly centralized republic that it is really a democracy.

The Jacksonian period, in administrative terms, was an attempt to put into practice much of Jefferson's democratic sentiment. Andrew Jackson's position on rotation in office was a movement toward reform for bureaucracy. Jackson wanted to introduce new men into public office and

move out those who had been there too long. Later called a "spoils system" the consequences of his policy were far beyond his intent to make bureaucracy more "democratic".

The Populists and the Progressives led the reform of government for the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The Populists reacted to increasing centralization of the economy, politics and administration. The movement was in general an expression of the alienation by those who were removed from the centers of influence and control. The Populists called for restoration of democracy during a time of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Alienation stemmed from the overwhelming change in society during that time and the increasing "influence of foreigners and uncontrollable manipulations of distant banks, railroads, corrupt politicians, and impersonal administration" (Marini & Pugh, 1981, 22).

The Progressive's influence was spread over the nation and led to the development of a distinctively American public administration. Responding to the same social problems as the Populists, the Progressives offered two solutions. One called for professionalization of public functions--making government more business-like and efficient. The other called for more widespread popular democracy. This created a dilemma for the movement calling for both elite and popular reforms. The particularly

American tension between bureaucracy and popular government became increasingly evident during this time.

The popular reforms brought about the initiative, the referendum, recall, party reform, civics education and other direct democracy reforms. The elite movement gave us the civil service system, the city manager plan, professional education and businesslike operation of government. The tension between the Populists and the Progressives probably most resembled the struggle between the need for competence in government and the equal need for popular participation.

The Beginning Of The Focused Study Of Public Administration: Struggling With Competence And Participation

The evolution of the field of public administration and the evolution of American politics continued to be reflected in changes in the accepted role of government through the conscious establishment of an institution of public administration. The conscious study of public administration more intensely highlighted the questions about the relationship between bureaucracy and popular government. Accepting the necessity of public bureaucracy emphasized the concomitant need to define public bureaucracy's place within popular government.

The essential identity struggle for the early study of public administration was the question about its separation or lack of separation from politics. This struggle increased the focus on bureaucracy's affect on the democratic process. How could bureaucracy be reconciled with democracy? How can citizens control their government when public administration officials are not elected but have generous access to policy making processes? The drive toward some vision of democracy has shaped the American administrative state (Cook, 1995; Stillman, 1991; Morone, 1990).

From the beginning of the self-conscious study of American public administration, those most concerned with the field have seen it in relation to democracy (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1900; Finer, 1941; Appleby, 1945; Waldo, 1948). The founding of American public administration, as a separate discipline, was supported largely by those who thought American democracy was in crisis resulting from corruption in the state but, paradoxically, also reacted as if democracy was a hindrance to the efficiency of bureaucracy. This was the essence of the struggle.

The founders of American public administration argued that reform could be achieved by moving public administration away from politics (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1900) which may have, in essence, moved it away from a

simplistic view of democracy--or rule by the people-- toward a more complex view of popular government, acknowledging the difficulties of the rhetorical self-government. A review of some of the earlier attempts to deal with this complexity will further clarify the problem.

Woodrow Wilson emphasized the need to separate questions into constitutional or administrative categories (1941). Waldo, (1984, 16), interprets Wilson as claiming that true democracy actually limits the administrative process by making efficiency difficult to achieve. Wilson taught that administrative questions were not political questions and the power in the hands of bureaucrats was no danger as long as there was responsibility associated with it and the actions of bureaucracy were open to public scrutiny. Publicity ensured public access and control.

Goodnow dealt with the dilemmas of the separation of powers among the branches in government by separating government into two functions: politics and administration. Good government required cooperation between the two with the subordination of the "executing authority" to the "expressing authority" (1987, 28). Public administration was a separate and important function of governance, but would have to operate under the watch of the elected representatives.

The famous debates between Carl Friedrich (1940) and Herman Finer (1941) over administrative responsibility, asked the students of public administration to think about whether internal codes of professionalism would suffice as controls over the bureaucracy or if it was necessary to have external legislative and popular control. To whom should bureaucrats be responsible and accountable?

In 1945, Paul Appleby asserted that government was different than business because government must be dedicated to the public interest. Government had to rely on public opinion and public deliberation. This process, in contrast to private business, is long and requires great expense because political involvement is necessary to act as a check on bureaucratic power.

These writers struggled with how public administration could execute public policy in the most efficient way while responding to the check of popular opinion. One solution was to make public administration a separate function in the process of governance; a body that does not fit into any of the three branches, but serves them all. The concept of the separation of politics and administration, for some time called a dichotomy, attempted to replace political values and philosophies in public administration with rational, scientific, technological focuses. The one best way to focus on administrative

management was to reach for economy and efficiency. The sharp distinction between politics and administration was not the original intent of the separation. But, the distinction did imply the possibility of action not grounded in partisanship (Marini, 1994). Though the move toward an apolitical administrative process was criticized by some, refocusing on managing facts and processes rather than values was expected to contribute to the reform of the public service.

The struggle continued to be addressed in the work of Dwight Waldo. Waldo (1984) was skeptical of relying on a scientific and technological focus at the expense of political values. He pointed out that the field of public administration itself contained elements of a political theory that could not be separated from science and technology. But, with the acceptance of scientific management, public administration was separated from the political importance of its work. Simplistic solutions for the politics-administration dichotomy led to theoretical disorder. The ubiquitous spread of faith in scientific answers complicated the question. Could science explain how public administration fits with constitutional principles or how public servants should behave in the policy process (Waldo, 1984, xxi)?

Waldo has been among those who questioned whether democracy could survive the bureaucracy. In *The Administrative State* (1984), Waldo characterized the struggle in political terms. He acknowledged the complicated issues between centralized and decentralized governments, addressing the question of who should rule. Waldo believed the need for skilled professionals in the bureaucracy posed many, possibly unsolvable, questions about the interpretations of democracy and the tyranny of bureaucracy. The control of tyranny, of course, has been the draw toward popular, limited, government that is answerable to citizens. Waldo believed the dilemma might never be resolved.

But, the literature continued to focus on the struggle to find the role of public bureaucracy within democracy. Many important contributions to public administration in recent years have been centrally related to the question of the need to recover democracy or make public administration more democratic. Some express concern and caution about over-reliance on administrative discretion (Hyneman, 1950; Redford, 1969; Mosher, 1982). The alleged incompatibility of our democratic polity and long tradition with our hierarchical, elitist, and some would say, relatively autocratic public administration is frequently perceived as a crisis. A review of individual

attempts to approach a more democratic public administration reveals both a fear of bureaucratic power and a vision for its democratic possibilities.

According to Charles Hyneman (1950), bureaucracy must be judged by the way it uses its power, rather than by its size and cost. He recognized the possibility of bureaucratic tyranny and believed that elected officials, representing the people, must be the primary check on the bureaucracy. Hyneman said that the American people have authorized only their elected officials to speak for them. The discretion of administrators should be limited since they can not be controlled by direct recall. Politics, in Hyneman's prescription, should control government action and Congress should have the most power and discretion to determine the details of a law or policy.

Emmett Redford (1969) attempted to reconcile the administrative state with democracy through the concept of democratic morality. In his perspective, the administrative state exists to care for shared needs that are beyond individuals or private groups. Redford claims public administration has an adjustment quality that mediates between and among groups in society, a quality that makes it political, and perhaps facilitates democracy. It also has a directive quality that involves decisions for continuous implementation of administrative actions and

goals. But, he required that administrative actions be returned to the macro-political level for review and support. Redford argued that administration is legitimate if it conforms as well as possible to this democratic morality.

Frederick Mosher (1982) like Redford and Hyneman, required a political check on bureaucracy. Mosher was concerned about how professionals in government could be controlled. He questioned the wisdom of a bureaucracy that is run democratically, giving discretion to civil servants. How do we ensure they adhere to the purposes of the people? Elected officials can be removed from office, unlike administrators. Administrators are chosen on the basis of special criteria, not able to be unelected. Mosher addressed the complexities of a bureaucracy that is democratically run and/or a bureaucracy that is responsible to the democracy.

These writers were optimistic about bureaucracy's role in democracy but cautious about its dangers. They recognized the benefits of a competent bureaucracy in the American political system but were careful about overstepping their power. They agreed that democratic process must be preserved.

Ambivalence about the democratic possibilities of public administration and a growing societal distrust of

bureaucracy led to the appearance of the Blacksburg Manifesto and *Refounding Public Administration* (Wamsley, et. al, 1990). In these publications several contributors defended public administration and theorized about its important role in democracy. This discussion incited varied responses. Legitimacy for public administration became the goal.

Legitimacy For Public Administration

Trying to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy led to questions of its legitimacy in the American political system. In *Refounding Public Administration* (Wamsley, et.al., 1990), an outgrowth of the "Blacksburg Manifesto", several writers attempted to find a normative base for public administration in the founding of the United States, in the Constitution, and in the skills and experience of the members of public administration. Quoting Dwight Waldo, the Blacksburg group acknowledged that America was unique in the separation of the concepts of "good government" and "good management". *The Public Administration* (their emphasis), they claimed, is a major social asset to society because of the skills and experience of its members.

The Blacksburg participants addressed questions of authority, skill and knowledge in public administrators.

They chose to characterize public administration as governance rather than merely management in the public sector. They emphasized the importance of recognizing public administration as a social asset instead of denigrating it for partisan advantage. "The only possible source of governing impetuses that might keep our complex political system from either a dangerous concentration of power on the one hand, or, impotence or self-destruction on the other, is a public administration with the necessary professionalism, dedication, self-esteem, and legitimacy to act as the constitutional center of gravity" (Wamsley, 1990, 26).

The "Refounding" group addressed legitimacy based on public administration's "distinctive relationship to the public interest" (1990, 41). They asserted that public administration has an institutional tradition and support system that nurtures a comprehensive, long-term, deliberative function that is essential to determining the public interest. More than any other association in society, including political parties, interest groups, other branches of government, public administration has the potential for expressing the public will. They found legitimacy in this and wanted to foster it by more direct associations with the people in order to win their trust. In their second volume, they asserted that public

administration may be "the last best hope of a constitutional and democratic republic" (Wamsley and Wolf, 1996, 27). This was an attempt to bridge the skill and experience of bureaucracy with popular sovereignty.

The Blacksburg group incited renewed discussion about the dilemma of the role of bureaucracy within popular government. In telephone interviews with some of the contributors to *Refounding Public Administration* (1990), several important topics of discussion and literature were identified as resulting from their contribution (C. Stivers, 1997; J. Rohr, 1997; C. Goodsell, 1997; also personal communication with L. Terry, 1997). Generally, the resulting discussion revolved around how to make public administration more democratic or to find legitimacy for a particularly undemocratic institution within a political system that assumes a democratic goal. Even prescriptions that recognize the special skill and experience of public administration attempt to justify its place as a facilitator of democratic intent. Searching for legitimacy for public administration or simply defining its role has generally led to connecting public administration with the citizenry in some more direct way, sometimes by-passing or minimizing the role of the elected representatives.

In spite of their commonly stated goal of democracy, current theories of public administration can be

divided into two streams of thought. One stream emphasizes the special competence of public administration and the importance of that competence to governance. The other stream emphasizes public administration's unique ability to facilitate public participation creating a more "democratic" state.

Participation

To answer questions of legitimacy, some scholars turned to the historical foundations of the United States of America emphasizing ideas of citizenship and participation. The perception that we are losing touch with the participatory and egalitarian theories of our democratic tradition is common (King & Stivers, 1998; King, Felty, & Susel, 1998; Box, 1998; Dennard 1996; Stivers 1996; Stivers, 1990).

Camilla Stivers (1990) pointed out that questions of legitimacy for public administration have their origin in the tension between a political system that is committed to individual freedom and justice as well as the prosperity and security of the nation as a whole. She asserted that public administration would not find its legitimacy without addressing its relationship to the citizens.

Stivers (1996; 1990) turned to historical views of citizenship to address the problems of an active

citizenship in the American political system. The Aristotelian perspective of an active citizen was a member of the polity, both ruling and ruled. The citizen needed practical wisdom or judgment to act on the level of the public interest. The active citizen had to reach beyond his or her own individual interests to find the interests of society as a whole. This type of citizenship is seen in contrast to liberalism's self-interested citizen who seeks individual rights.

From this perspective, professionalism in public service can potentially inhibit active citizen participants who often must capitulate to the "expert" role of the public administrator. Stivers asserts that definition of the public interest is not possible without the input of the citizen. Citizen participation, for Stivers, provides legitimacy to the work of public administration as well as nurturance toward the type of citizen needed to fulfill the role of active citizenship. Normative grounding for public administration must be rooted in an open understanding of the public interest and a "continuing constitutional refounding" that comes from ongoing public-spirited dialogue (1990, 273).

Dennard (1996) found legitimization in an identity for public administration that facilitates democracy rather than regulating the citizens. Treating citizens in an

officious, regulatory manner fosters undemocratic behavior in citizens. Dennard blames public administrators for teaching citizens to be competitive and mean spirited and calls for public administration to administer democratic change in society. Here again, we find the question of not only how bureaucracy fits into democracy, but also how bureaucracy can function democratically.

Dennard (1996) prescribes personal commitment on the part of individual administrators to address democratic responsibility, a "whole" view of society, empowering citizens to find their own way in government, accepting citizens as imperfect and diverse, recognize human suffering as an educative vehicle rather than just a problem to solve, and the ability to keep hard questions in the forefront of the role of public administrators.

Box (1998) advocates direct participation for citizens by advancing his conception of citizen governance. He creates internal and external citizen boards and committees made up of "informed citizens" who actually make lower level routine decisions within bureaucracy. Elected representatives in Box's citizen governance act as a community coordinating council responsible to clarify the issues, create opportunities for full public airing of information and concerns, coordinating citizen participation, facilitating interaction between citizens

and administrative agencies, arbitrating between competing interests, "sometimes making a final decision" by balancing citizen's interests (Box, 1998, 119).

King and Stivers' (1998) *Government is US*, is a collaborative effort to move citizenship into bureaucracy so that through citizenship, people may feel empowered to participate in government and find ways to develop their full human potential. King and Stivers see citizenship as a process of civic education that enables citizens to consider the public interest rather than their selfish interests. Citizenship creates a better community.

Competence

Other writers agreed with Blackburg's institutional perspective of public administration and further expounded on its agency role developing the concept of competent, skilled experience that is capable of long term focus. Terry (1995) explained that public administration was responsible for conserving the cultural values and traditions of political society. He argued that the primary function of administrators is to preserve institutional integrity. Public administration provides continuity and stability to the political system and the distinctive competence of public administration maintains constitutional values and processes.

Cook (1996) suggested that public administration has a larger responsibility as a constitutive or formative contributor to society. He added that public administration has a special opportunity to engage in deliberation with other public officials and the public contributing its specialized knowledge to enlarge the discussion from immediate concerns to long-term public goals. Both Terry (1995) and Cook (1996) explained that public bureaucracy does not pose a threat to democracy through control except by focusing only on its instrumental role rather than emphasizing public administration's unique ability to preserve, maintain, and enlarge the public interest.

Kass (1990) found a stewardship role for public administrators. He described the administrator's public trust as one of stewardship where ethical action includes serving a shared interest rather than responding to individuals. Administrators as agents preserve the interest of the whole from abuse by individuals.

Other current public administration theorists take different approaches, sometimes criticizing both the competence theorists and the participationists, but nevertheless deal with the concept of bureaucracy within popular government by recognizing competence or encouraging citizen participation.

Fox and Miller support competence in government by limiting those "who come to the table" in their version of public discourse to those who possess the necessary civic virtue and interest. Like the participationists, they also criticize the "representative democratic accountability feedback loop" (1995, 5) model of democracy as undemocratic. The procedure of aggregating individual preferences into a popular will, which is implemented by bureaucracy and evaluated by voters, lacks credibility as a democratic process. Fox and Miller also criticize both the constitutional refounding by the Blacksburg group and the attempt to connect citizens directly to bureaucracy as misstatements at solutions for bureaucratic legitimacy.

Both Cook (1996) and Burke (1986) criticize the attempt to make bureaucracy the protector of democracy. Burke explained that bureaucracy does not have the time or even the ability to act as the institution of democracy. But, Burke (1994; 1986) makes an argument for increased citizen participation as well as for increased education for citizens so they can make more informed choices.

In each of these cases, public administration has a special perspective on the public interest and a special contribution to make to the political system. The goal for each theorist is to protect and facilitate popular government in spite of his or her different approaches and

assumptions. Using the framework of competence and participation from Mill's work will suggest a middle ground for discussion. Using Mill's theory of government, competence can live with participation and participation can live with competence. In this study we will see how Mill developed the bridge.

Bureaucracy And Popular Government

The literature we just reviewed suggests that the greatest difficulty in finding a legitimate place for bureaucracy may be the inability to reconcile the concept of governance by skilled, experienced, experts, with the belief that government should be run by the "people". The potential abuse of power by those who possess professional skill and expertise is a concern for advocates of popular government. But, Classical theories of democracy, often turned to as models for current popular government, were more concerned with limiting rule by a hereditary aristocracy than by limiting the influence of experience and skill in self-government (Bacharach, 1967; Wolin, 1960).

Currently, questioning the wisdom of increased democracy is considered unacceptable (Cook, 1996). Some claim that democracy has gained such general legitimacy in

postmodern society that the term is used indiscriminately and its meaning has been compromised (March & Olsen, 1995; Dahl, 1989). When we discuss democracy within public administration literature there is sometimes confusion about what we are really referring to (Marini, 1994).

To complete the analytical framework, I will take a brief look at some of the ways bureaucracy has been described within public administration literature and the different labels that have been given to the American political system. This will point to the difficulty inherent in reconciling the concepts for American public administration.

Bureaucracy is often described as an unavoidable consequence of modern society (Hyneman, 1950; Weber, 1978) from an organizational perspective, and as an "administrative state" for purposes of discussing its functions in governance (Rohr, 1986; Waldo, 1984). It may be described according to its characteristics; such as hierarchy, authority, subordination, rules, expertise, rationality or efficiency (Weber, 1978; Gulick, 1992; Simon, 1976). It has also been described in terms of its ability and responsibility to right injustices in society (Marini, 1971; Wamsley et.al, 1990, Wamsley & Wolf, 1996). Bureaucracy has been given an important role as an

"institution" that maintains social and cultural values (Cook, 1996; Terry, 1995). And, as we have seen, bureaucracy can be valued as a facilitator of democracy (Box, 1998; King & Stivers, 1998). Differences in the perceived roles and responsibilities of public administration fall into both positive and negative categories as best characterized by Goodsell (1994) and Hummel (1994) respectively. This brief review of a few descriptives from the literature suggests that a comprehensive theoretical construct of bureaucracy should include organizational, political, and social characteristics.

American Government has been defined in many ways. In some cases, it is defined in more than one way in a single article or book; a constitutional system of government, a rule of law system, democratic rule, regime of ordered liberty, and constitutional democracy (Morgan, 1990). Or, in another piece, a democratic state, a republic, and a pluralist democracy (Kass, 1990). The American political system has been called a republican government (Beach, et. al., 1997), a constitutional republic (Rohr, 1986), a liberal democratic regime (Cook, 1996), or a republican government with democratic processes of governance (Wamsley et.al., 1990; Wamsley & Wolf, 1996).

Another view said, that in contrast to our "misconception that our sustaining values are democratic", they are "more accurately, liberal, republican and constitutional" (Marini, 1994, 5).

A theoretical construct of American government drawn from the literature includes various qualified labels of democracy, constitutionalism, or republicanism. The presence of the varying conceptualizations of our political system makes the discussion of the issues that arise out of the attempt to reconcile bureaucracy to popular government, more difficult. Popular government is often assumed to mean democracy. However, popular government refers to any number of variations with the unique characteristic of popular sovereignty in government (Marini, 1994).

To begin the analysis and application of John Stuart Mill's theory of government to these conceptualizations within American public administration, we will look at Mill's views on democracy and popular government. Mill has been inconsistently characterized as one of the prime democratic theorists and paradoxically, also as a political elitist. These characterizations reflect the maturation of Mill's political views over the years through stages of emotional and intellectual development. In the next chapter, we will look at the

stages of Mill's intellectual development and the outcome of his study and experience.

CHAPTER III
MILL AND DEMOCRACY

John Stuart Mill has been reported to be one of the prime "democratic theorists" in many arguments (Selznick, 1992; Dahl, 1989; Burke, 1986; Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970). Pateman (1970) included him in her list of theorists who advance participatory democracy. She focused on Mill's concern for the importance of participation by the individual in his or her self-government.

Barber (1984) also used Mill's arguments for political participation as civic education to support his "strong democracy." Peter Bachrach (1967) discussed Mill's interest in participation as an example of self-developmental democracy. Selznick (1992) considered Mill's discussion of participation as moral instruction and a facilitator of public spirit, the major premise of communal democracy (1992, 552). Dahl (1989) included Mill's writing in his examination of democratic processes but criticized

Mill's contention that participation can foster a democratic personality.

But, Mill has also been characterized as a political elitist because of his belief in the need for competent leadership in government. Mill believed that the idea of democracy was not that the people themselves had to govern, but that they retain ultimate control over their government (1961b). Burke (1994) explained that Mill was a liberal but not a democrat. Mill was an advocate of education and skill as necessary characteristics for competent leadership in government. His central concern was liberty, individual rights, and limited government. However, he spent much of his reformist life attempting to remove government from the hands of aristocrats. His first argumentative essay was a statement against aristocratic prejudice. He argued that the poor were no less moral than the rich were therefore, they should not be excluded from participating in government based on heredity or financial qualifications (1957a, 46).

Mill gives a greater role to citizens than do most other elitist theorists (Thompson, 1976). Mill's focus on the educative role of participation included universal suffrage. Mill was trained to be a reformer by his father,

James Mill and by Jeremy Bentham (Robson, 1968). This training made a lasting impression on him demonstrated in his commitment to emancipation for women and workers and slaves.

While Mill was a strong advocate of popular, limited government, and did argue the benefits of participation, he was concerned that democracy, and especially pure democracy, presented some problems for good government. Mill's theory of government asserted the necessity and desirability of competent leadership within popular government in order to mediate some of the dangers of democracy. The complexity of Mill's writings and the comprehensive character of Mill's theory of government have provided many writers the opportunity to use his work as a justification of various and sometimes conflicting viewpoints.

Mill experienced growth and change in his ideas over the years. His writing shows an interest in learning throughout his life (Robson, 1968). This led some to accuse him of inconsistencies in his writing. There were "two Mills" according to Himmelfarb (1963, vii). Mill, very aware of the change in his views and his process of maturity, explained the reasons for this growth and change

in his autobiography (1957a). The "two Mills" were separated by the event of his "mental crisis" where, in the midst of depression, Mill realized that his unusually intense education directed by James Mill and Jeremy Bentham lacked any "benevolence or sympathy with mankind," contained a "superabundance of discipline, mere logic, and analysis," and under valued feelings (1957a, 71). For several years after this depression, Mill worked to reevaluate all that he had been taught.

A strong influence in Mill's reevaluation of ideas was his wife, Harriet Taylor. Taylor was an intellectual woman, Mill's equal in strength of mind, if not volume of knowledge. Mill credits Taylor for her contributions to the comprehensiveness and depth of his ideas and refers to her as his occasional co-author in his autobiography (1957a). This reference and the change in his views after his mental crisis lead some to question whether Mill's later work was written by Taylor (Himmelfarb, 1963; Lerner, 1961). Letters between them and Mill's autobiography show the respect Mill had for her ideas and the projects they shared. However, whether Taylor can be given full credit for Mill's later work is not clear.

Mill's intense education, the reevaluation of his views, and perhaps, the influence of his wife's ideas, along with his experience as an administrator in the East India Company and election to Parliament, gave Mill a complex understanding of government and society that led him to develop a comprehensive theory of government. A look at Mill's earliest influences, the development of his ideas and his subsequent reevaluation of his knowledge will help to frame a discussion of his views on democracy.

Mill's Early Influences

Mill lived from 1806 to 1873. For the first twenty years of John Stuart Mill's life, his father, James Mill and family friend, Jeremy Bentham, worked together to train the younger Mill to become their successor in intellectual and moral thought (Robson, 1968). From the age of three, the elder Mill and Bentham used the child as an educational experiment, believing that children could learn much more in those younger years than was commonly thought (1957a). He was systematically taught and drilled in classic literature, languages, and logic.

Some friends of the family reported that James Mill was abusive toward John Stuart Mill (see Robson, 1968;

Lerner, 1961). James Mill seemed to be somewhat irritated when his eldest son was able to match him in logic and analysis although that was what he trained him to do. The younger Mill enjoyed contradicting his father and arguing specific points in an attempt to impress him. There was little warmth or affection between John Stuart Mill and his father, a fact that would contribute to his mental breakdown.

Mill explained that his education had been, to a great extent, "a course of Benthamism" (1957a, 42). He was taught to apply Bentham's standard of "the greatest happiness" to all the opinions he formed. Mill was impressed with the scientific application of the happiness principle to human actions and their potential for improving human affairs. From Bentham's calculated principles could be extracted models of what human opinions and institutions ought to be and how they could be changed (1957a). Bentham's influence on John Stuart Mill's life was unmistakable. Although Mill would later criticize Bentham's narrow views and disagree with his father, he retained his basic belief in the principle of utility. Mill wrote in his autobiography:

The 'principle of utility' understood as Bentham understood it, and applied in the manner in which he applied it through these three volumes, fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conception of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life. And I had a grand conception laid before me of changes to be effected in the condition of mankind through that doctrine. (1957a, 44)

Thus, Bentham's ideas played a foundational role in his training as a social reformer. Mill was always an advocate in the attempt to change existing society into the best possible society through the principle of utility.

The principle of utility holds that human beings are attracted to pleasure and repulsed by pain. Utilitarians reduced all of human behavior to a simple calculation of pleasure and pain (Himmelfarb, 1963). Reducing moral judgment to a single empirical principle meant that legislation could be drafted that would lead to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Selznick, 1992).

The social interaction of human beings produces pain through conflicts. This pain can be lessened by carefully defining all anti-social acts and creating laws

that would augment the total happiness of the community. Bentham believed that rationalization of the law would allow legislation to lessen friction and increase happiness. This stress on pain and pleasure was partly attractive to him because it seemed to be the basic observable and measurable element of human motivation and therefore a key to human behavior.

However, Utilitarians denied any qualitative differences in pleasure. Bentham explained that "pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry" (Waldo, 1984). One person's pleasure was equal to another person's pleasure; every pleasure was equal in value. With all pleasures equal in value, a simple moral arithmetic could be devised that would be understandable to both the private person and to the legislator (Robson, 1968). Bentham's ethics made up a theory of how men should act; a moral judgment based on means ends rationality. This rational means to ends component became the classical utilitarian justification for democracy (Dahl, 1989). Satisfying wants can be best accomplished through the political processes of democracy. This instrumental view of democracy, according to Utilitarians, led to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Mill's Reconceptualization Of Utility

John Stuart Mill led the Philosophical Radicals, a group of men who used Bentham's ideas to create an ideology drawing on utilitarian philosophy. But, being both politicians and philosophers, their experiences in politics eventually changed their judgments and values concerning Bentham and his politics (Hamburger, 1965). This was especially true for Mill who admitted that Bentham and his father had turned him into a "mere reasoning machine" existing in a state of habitual analysis with little value placed on humanity and a principle of happiness void of feeling (1957a, 71).

Mill criticized Bentham after his death as a half-thinker, "a systematic and accurately logical half-man" (1963, 95). Mill learned that Bentham's "pushpin is as good as poetry" was not literally true when reading poetry brought him to tears and began his journey to experience the difference in pleasures. Mill discovered that happiness was more than self-interest. In fact, much of human happiness was other-focused. Mill believed that certain ways of life were better than others when measuring justness, and equality, for example (Morales, 1996). He believed in the existence of a moral conscience and self-

respect. Human nature included an appreciation of honor, beauty, and concern for others. Bentham's utility could not include motives such as sympathy and personal affection. Bentham only saw the necessity of laws drafted for self-interested people who seek to maximize pleasure (all measured equally) and avoid punishment and pain. Consequently, Mill revolted against the quantitative concept of pleasure underlying Bentham's Utilitarian philosophy (Morales, 1996; Selznick, 1992; Waldo, 1984; Piest, 1957).

Mill differed with Bentham on his conception of politics (Morales, 1996). Bentham saw government as an art concerned with finding the legal foundation for promoting the general happiness. This foundation would be made up of rules, principles, and policies that promoted utility. Mill was more concerned with education and the role of government in facilitating the improvement of people. He believed that institutions (political, as well as social, religious, and familial) had an educative effect on individuals and that social reform should be concerned with improving the moral character of the individual through these institutions.

Mill was concerned with *social* utility and appreciated the contemporary socialist criticisms of classical liberalism (Morales, 1996, Selznick, 1992). Although he was not a socialist, he saw the necessity of government intervention to improve the quality of life and moved away from a belief in economic individualism. Still, Mill remained a strong defender of individuality, insisting on its critical role in the progress of society (Selznick, 1992).

Mill stated that he had not substituted a new philosophy for the one he rejected, but realized that the true system was "much more complex and many-sided" than he had previously realized (1957a, 104). He began to reject the idea that there was one set of model institutions. He believed that "all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute", and that different stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different institutions (1957a, 104, 105). Kaplan (1997), in an essay on the future of democracy in the present world, similarly explains that countries are not always ready for democracy or self-government. There are certain social and economic achievements that are necessary to the successful

functioning of democracy-like governments. Consequently, one ideal government will not fit all states.

Mill did not have an ideal end-state in mind, but a philosophy of human progress. He thought that governments must be made for human beings as they are or can soon become. The choice of political institutions was a question of moral and educational progress. In a recent examination of the role of government, Cook (1996) agreed that political institutions have an educational function for society and can not be externally defined according to an ideal regime. Institutions educate, but are also shaped by actual political practice and the activity and relations among citizens.

Mill thought government should serve and improve the people at the point at which they stood by using the best qualities available in society to lead toward the next step in their progress. Moral and educational progress in the masses would not take place as long as aristocrats held the power. "I thought the predominance of the aristocratic classes, the noble and the rich in the English Constitution, an evil worth any struggle to get rid of" (1957a, 110). Mill sometimes seemed ambivalent on this point because, as will be discussed later, he also

appreciated some of the qualities the aristocrats brought to government. His main concern, though, was the evil of rule by any class.

Mill's interest in equality in popular government was concerned with limiting the power of the aristocratic classes and increasing participation by the masses to improve the condition of society. He explained that this struggle to rid the country of rule by the aristocracy is "not on account of taxes, or any such comparatively small inconvenience" but because aristocracy was the great demoralizing agency in the country. Aristocracy demoralized the country in two ways. First, "it made the conduct of the government an example of gross public immorality, through the predominance of private over public interests in the State, and the abuse of the powers of legislation for the advantage of classes" (1957a, 110). Mill's desire for institutional civic education by example was defeated by the demoralizing effect of aristocratic leadership that catered to its own class interest.

Aristocratic rule was demoralizing also "because the respect of the multitude always attaching itself principally to that which, in the existing state of society, is the chief passport to power; and under English

institutions riches, hereditary or acquired, being the almost exclusive source of political importance; riches and the signs of riches, were almost the only things really respected, and the life of the people was mainly devoted to the pursuit of them" (1957a, 110). Mill saw that the masses, learning from the example of the rich, were most interested in obtaining power, the source of which, in England (as in most countries) was wealth. Mill's choice of political institutions was not a question of material interests, but of moral and educational interests. Government had a higher purpose than improving the economic state of the people. The primary focus on wealth detracted from the moral and intellectual progress of the state.

Mill believed that as long as the aristocratic class held the power of government, it would not be in their self-interest to educate the masses because it would threaten their power. He continued, "but if the democracy obtained a large, and perhaps the principle, share in the governing power, it would become the interest of the opulent classes to promote their education, in order to ward off really mischievous errors" (1957a, 111). Mill believed the democracy would be a leveler against aristocracy, for equality, but he still believed the best

qualified should lead (Thompson, 1976). The masses, in their present state, would not have the knowledge and experience to govern well, and could present a formidable threat to the state of society. But, if given the opportunity to participate in government, the Aristocratic classes would see that it was in their interest to make sure the masses had the knowledge to make the best decisions possible in the public interest.

Mill explained, in his autobiography, that despite his departure from the full acceptance of Bentham and James Mill's views, he was as much as ever a radical and democrat for Europe and England. Radicalism in his era was a support for the rapidly rising liberalism in politics (1957a). People wanted reform to stop the renewed oppression by old reigning families. Liberals believed the aristocrats conspired against liberty. The government was unpopular because of the national debt and excessive taxation, but Mill thought the problems were more serious than that. Mill's claim to be a radical and a democrat was in opposition to the limitations of rule by the aristocratic class.

Mill explained that the greatest change in his thinking had taken place during his mental crisis but that

the most substantial changes in his political opinions developed over time. The most influential facilitator of the change in his opinions about democracy came from reading M. de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. Mill was impressed by how well the "excellences of democracy" were pointed out, while the "specific dangers which beset democracy, considered as the government of the numerical majority, were brought into equally strong light" (1957a, 123). Mill found in Tocqueville's work a balanced report of the weaknesses of popular government and the defenses and corrections which would neutralize them at the same time giving its benefits the opportunity to work (1957a). Mill marked this experience as the point of his shift from the political ideal of pure democracy to the modified form of representative government.

Mill's Concerns About Democracy

Mill's criticisms of democracy did not lead him to question whether or not to choose democracy, because he believed Tocqueville's assertion that democracy was inevitable--"not to consider whether democracy shall come, but how to make the best of it when it does come" (1961b, vi). Mill explained that Tocqueville's general conclusion

was that "democracy, in the modern world, is inevitable; and that it is, on the whole, desirable; but desirable only under certain conditions" (1961c, viii).

Mill expected to learn from Tocqueville's study of America, how the best characteristics of democracy could be strengthened and how the negative aspects could be controlled. He believed that the choice that humans had in this inevitable move toward democracy was "between a well and an ill-regulated democracy" (1961b, xiii). Mill and Tocqueville believed that democracy modified and instructed, was good, but left free to evolve it would suffer and become dangerous in its excesses.

Mill's criticisms generally involved the mediocrity that was associated with equality in democratic government, the subsuming power of the majority over minorities, the lack of diversity, and the loss of individuality. Mill was still concerned with the Utilitarian principle of happiness and he believed that popular government would contribute to the happiness enjoyed by the people. Both Mill and Tocqueville saw democracy as a "less brilliant" form of government, but one in which its natural capabilities could be nurtured to improve the state of society (1961b, viii).

Equality

Tocqueville did not associate democracy with any particular form of government. Democracy was more a condition of society. Mill tells us that Tocqueville understood democracy to be equality of conditions and the absence of aristocracy. He went on to explain that Tocqueville believed the state of society was evolving toward this equality of conditions and that its tendency would naturally be to produce a popular government.

Mill warned that Tocqueville may have confused the effects of democracy with the effects of civilization (1961c, xlii). The move toward equality of conditions may have been the result of modern commercial society and rational prosperity, which, in itself, was not a cause of democracy. Mill said that although commercial civilization lead to a rapid increase in the size of the middle class there were other features of this progress that were not necessarily equal or democratic.

The middle class influenced financial success. Mill reported that much more money was made by supplying the wants of the middle class than by supplying the poor and the wealthy. Mill believed that much of what Tocqueville found in the United States was associated with

the growth of the middle class and not necessarily democracy. He pointed out that this modern commercial progress did not eliminate the extremes in society--the poor and the rich. A state of equality had not been reached.

Tocqueville observed that "democracy reigns with undisputed empire; and equality of condition among mankind has reached what seems its ultimate limit" (1961b, xii). In fact, a condition of equality had not been reached in the United States. Mill explained the limitations of Tocqueville's observations:

We do not allude merely to the exclusion of paupers and menial servants, or to the existence, in many States of a property qualification for electors...we allude, in the first place to the slaves; and not only to them, but to all free persons having the slightest admixture of Negro blood, who are ruthlessly excluded, in some States by law, and in the remainder by actual bodily fear, from the exercise of any of the smallest political right. As for social equality, it may be judged how far they are in possession of it, when no white person will sit at the same table with them, or in the same bench in a public room, and when there is scarcely any lucrative occupation open to them except that of domestic servants, which in that country the white race do not relish. It is scarcely necessary to add that in America as elsewhere, one entire half of the human race is wholly excluded from the political equality so much boasted of, and that in point of social equality their position is still more dependent than in Europe. In the American democracy, the aristocracy of skin and the aristocracy of sex retain their privileges. (1961b, xii)

Mill was an advocate of equality, still recognizing differences among people. He argued for universal suffrage throughout most of his adult life. Mill placed some conditions on universal suffrage in an attempt to limit the harmful effects of mass democracy. Those will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Mill's concern here was that the growth of the middle class not be confused with democracy and the general equality of conditions.

As we saw earlier, Mill was more concerned with the moral and intellectual advancement of society and disagreed with a primary focus on commercial progress. He believed that interest in wealth and prosperity, ignoring philosophical advances would create an unbalanced society. This was the same argument he had against aristocracy. The focus on wealth as the source of power demoralized society. Mill said that the unbalanced influence of the commercial interest was the most serious danger to the future of mankind (1961c, xlix). However, in aristocratic society, Mill saw the ability for high intellectual achievement and its consequently beneficial influence on the quality of government. Mill did not see this in American democracy.

Mediocrity

Tocqueville reported that American democracy chose bad leaders: unskillful and often "despicable" (1961b, xxvii). He observed that the most qualified and most distinguished men are seldom called to serve in American government. Referring again to the equal conditions Tocqueville found, Mill explained that when all are in the same economic circumstances and all are educated alike, all think alike. It is impossible to instruct the masses of people beyond a certain level when they do not have the time to devote to learning. Mill believed that the people did not have time to learn more than the basics of government because they had to earn a living. If they did not have to work to live, they would then cease to be "the people". Masses, educated alike, either choose people like themselves to govern or choose the person who uses the most money to make emotional appeal to their interests. Consequently, their leaders are frequently inferior and the result levels wisdom rather than raising the intelligence of the people. A government "less brilliant" but in the long run, Mill believed participation by the people in their government could, if properly nurtured, produce greater results (1961c, xlvi).

Mill often compared aristocracy to democracy to show the limitations of each. He explained that aristocracy is too paternalistic as a form of government. Participation by the people in their own governing ensured that their interests would not be set aside and also served to instruct the people in civic virtue. Aristocracy did not do these things, but aristocracy was a much more skillful government. The focus of an aristocratic government could be much more future oriented. Democracy's policy becomes hasty and shortsighted and although the interests of the majority are usually represented, that does not necessarily constitute the interests of all the people nor the best interests of the majority (1961b, xxix).

Loss of Individuality and Lack of Diversity

The voice of the majority often caused the individual to become increasingly insignificant. Mill was greatly concerned with the individual's ability to retain unique characteristics and opinions in democratic society. The more equal, the more helpless individuals become in the mass (1961c, xxix). In one of his best known writings, *On Liberty* (1961a), Mill defended extensive liberty for

individuals and explains his views on conformity and mediocrity in mass government.

Mill had a consistent desire to maximize the benefits of diversity throughout his writing. The lack of diversity, the spread of sameness, he explained, is to some extent a requirement for popular government (1958). Mass decision making relies on common values, needs, and desires to come to a majority position from which to determine the legal structure of society. However, this sameness also camouflages difference and contributes to mediocrity since diverse opinion is often squelched because few want to disagree with the ruling masses (1961a).

Mill stressed that liberty for the individual is important for the development of the individual and for the development of society. Mill believed that there was an appropriate region of human liberty that should be separate from the control of society in order to maintain diversity (1961a). This region includes, first, liberty of conscience, which means liberty of thought and feeling with absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects. Second, liberty of tastes and pursuits includes doing as we like, subject to whatever consequences may follow since others may disagree with us, think we are foolish or wrong.

Mill does limit this liberty at the point of harming others. Third is the liberty of combination. This is the freedom of association, free for any purpose except to harm others. He also stipulated that persons must be of age, and not forced or deceived into joining this association (1961a, 265).

Society is not free without these particular liberties. Pursuing our own happiness in our own way without depriving or impeding others of their pursuits is Mill's definition of freedom (1961a). Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness have a familiar ring in its utilitarian roots. Mill admitted that this doctrine is not new, but that in spite of its widespread acceptance, society--whether as rulers or fellow citizens--continues to compel people to conformity.

Another feature of the equalization of conditions that contributed to the spread of conformity was increased literacy. Although, at the time Mill wrote, literacy was still dismally sparse, the masses were beginning to have access to the thoughts and opinions of others. He believed that as the masses realized that others held similar opinions, they would discover their strength as a class and choose to exert it.

Knowledge that helped the masses form and express opinions could create a formidable political power. This knowledge, he explained, is not necessarily the highest form of knowledge, but informative enough that the masses could join together to express their interests (1961c, xv). This power, Mill called bourgeois opinion, stifled individual expression. People were afraid of being different, or thought of as peculiar.

Tocqueville found that in America, tyranny over opinions diminished the individuality of character, thought and opinions of the people (1961b, xxxix). He observed that as long as the majority had not decided a public question, there was great discussion. Yet the discussion was limited to hearing prescribed and accepted opinions that had been expressed by those who could be considered opinion leaders (1961c, xxix). Then, once the question was decided, all the people went along with the decision, whether for or against the form of its resolution.

Tocqueville wrote: "...the majority is possessed of a power at once physical and moral, which acts upon the will as much as upon the conduct, and restrains at once the act and the desire to perform it. I am acquainted with no country in which their reigns, in general, less

independence of mind, and real freedom of discussion than in America" (1961b, xxxix). Americans hold freedom of speech as a main tenant of our liberty, but Tocqueville saw this freedom limited in the political realm. In essence, he saw that in America, we could stand on the street corner and proclaim our views without being arrested, but we cannot enjoy acceptance or be taken seriously as a candidate for political office if our view is too different from the majority. Minority opinion is not well represented in politics. Mill and Tocqueville believed that the majority was intolerant of dissenters (1961b, xliii). The power of the majority had to be tempered like any other power.

Tyranny of the Majority

The concept of popular government seemed like the ideal form of government until it was widely practiced. Mill said that people began to see that "such phrases as self-government, and the power of the people over themselves do not express the true state of the case" (1961a, 257). Self-government is not government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. He explained that the will of the people, "practically, means the will of the

most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority" (1961a, 258). Mill believed there was evil in the preponderance of any class because it limited the diversity of opinion.

Tocqueville was concerned to find a total absence of security against the tyranny of the majority in America (1961c, xxvii). Mill and Tocqueville believed that all were equally tempted to abuse power--rulers and citizens alike. Mill explained that Americans seem likely to abuse the power of the majority over its antipathies of religion, political party, or race. This tyranny would not come in the form of laws since Americans preferred limited government and laws would generally provide liberty. However, the majority could by-pass laws, knowing that a jury of their peers would never convict them of illegal acts against minorities.

Mill provided examples. Pinpointing some of America's prejudices, he points out that there were no laws prohibiting Roman Catholic schools in Massachusetts nevertheless, citizens could burn a school to the ground without legal redress. Similarly, people in Philadelphia destroyed the homes of Abolitionists, and the schools and

churches of "their fellow black citizens" while mobs stood by entertained by the sight (1961c, xxvii). We could continue this list of examples by including the general acceptance of the "separate but equal" laws or the McCarthy hearings in recent history. Mill pointed out that these prejudices and actions could exist in any country, but they are particularly tyrannical in a state where there is little recourse against the public opinion of the majority.

The consequences of equality, then, result in the leveling of intellect and morals in both the government and in the masses, the submission of the minority to majority opinion, and the loss of individuality. Tocqueville and Mill believed that opinions of the general interest would continue to become more rooted and difficult to change and that independence and moral courage were in danger of being lost in the advancement of democracy. The best corrective to this problem was education. The best form of democracy that "on the one hand most exercises and cultivates the intelligence and mental activity of the majority, and on the other, breaks the headlong impulses of popular opinion, by delay, rigor of forms, and adverse discussion" (1961c, xl) would be the best choice for popular government.

Mill equally believed that the tendency of democracy to limit individuality and diversity must be corrected. Focusing on higher pursuits such as philosophy and art, encouraging the superior intellects to take part in government, and encouraging diversity and dissent would contribute to the advancement of society. Modern society was in danger of becoming uniform.

The evils of democracy, according to Mill, have much to do with an erroneous idea of what democracy ought to be. "All the dangers of democracy, and all that gives any advantages to its enemies, turn upon confounding this distinction. The idea of a rational democracy is, not that the people themselves govern, but that they have security for good government" (1961b, xxx). Mill believed that the people were responsible for choosing good governors and for retaining the ultimate control of those governors in their own hands. He explained that the ideally best form of government is where the "sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal

discharge of some public function, local or general" (1958, 42). This ideally best form of government, for Mill, was representative government. In the next chapter, we will look at Mill's criteria for good government and how he used this ideal form of government to mediate the dangers of democracy.

CHAPTER IV
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Mill laid out his "ideally best form of government" in his essay, *Considerations on Representative Government* written in 1861. He explained that this essay was the culmination of his thoughts on government, a connected exposition representing considerable study, evaluation, and experience with government. By this time, Mill had carefully considered Tocqueville's experience with democracy in the United States, he had served as a public administrator in the East India Company and he had served as an elected member of Parliament. Mill's essay was not an attempt to set out a simple principle of government that would fit all populations at all times. Mill thought that government must be made for human beings as they were or could soon become. The essay is a complex treatment of a complicated subject that can be viewed as constituting an "ideal type" description of popular government. Mill agreed with Tocqueville that democracy was an inevitable

progression of modern civilization. Himmelfarb (1963) explained that Mill was not trying to make democratic government more democratic, but trying to make it better by devising ways of limiting it.

Democracy had certain dangers, according to Mill. Representative democracy could be structured in such a way to compensate for these shortcomings. In his essay on government, Mill attempted to compensate for some of the dangers of democracy by emphasizing the importance of competent leadership balanced by popular participation. It was his belief that properly understood and administered; representative government might yet be the best form of government in practice as well as theory.

The phrase "properly administered" is a crucial one, of course. How Mill would have representative democracy administered is better understood if one recalls the potential he believes democracy has for becoming bad government. This potential included its tendency to become majoritarian rule, its tendency toward collective mediocrity in the citizenry and in the governing body, and its tendency to limit individual liberty. Mill wrote that the "best form of a popular constitution" combines "complete popular control over public affairs with the

greatest attainable perfection of skilled agency" (1957a, 170). This combination led to achievement of Mill's essential elements of good government.

Criteria For Good Government

Mill was careful, in laying out his theory of government, to explain that good government was more than simply good institutions well run. Good government is more than honest officials. The first element of good government is "the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community" (1958, 25). Mill believed that the level of advancement of the people determined what type of government would be good for them. In order to have good government, virtuous and intelligent people must make up the community. Consequently, the most important role of the government is "to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves" (1958, 25). The government and the people have a reciprocal relationship. Political institutions are defined by the political action of the people and people are educated by the political institutions. Good government cannot exist without good people.

Mill reminded us again that government is made up of human beings and their actions. If "the agents, or those who choose the agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or the lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check all these are mere masses of ignorance, stupidity, and baleful prejudice, every operation of government will go wrong" (1958, 25). In a "self-government" citizens are responsible for the operation of their government. If they do not possess the necessary level of interest, civic virtue and morality their government will reflect their inadequacies.

Virtue And Intelligence Of A People

Mill believed that a people may prefer a free government but if they are unable to preserve it, if they are unfit for liberty, they are in danger of loosing it to an authoritarian power (1958). In his introduction to Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1961b), Mill understood that Tocqueville feared a democratic people, weary of anarchy and incapable of self-government who would give over its democratic state to a despotic authority. Pateman (1970) described the fear of democratic societies falling into the hands of totalitarianism and despotic government.

She explained that at the beginning of the 20th century participation became linked to totalitarianism rather than to democracy with the collapse of the Weimar Republic into fascism and the post-war establishment of totalitarian regimes based on mass participation.

Kaplan (1997) warned that Hitler and Mussolini came to power through democracy. The early 1900's were characterized by the breakdown of democratic governments into dictatorships: fascism in Italy, dictatorship in Poland, military rule in Argentina, authoritarian takeovers in Germany, Austria, and Spain (Dahl, 1989). Kaplan (1997) quoted Tocqueville saying, "despotism is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages." He attributed this to the democratic obsession with self-interest.

Mill insisted that popular government requires a certain level of public morality and civic virtue. If the citizens are not sufficiently interested in their own government, the institution can become an instrument of tyranny for anyone with a strong belief: "one person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests" (1958, 13). The causes and conditions of good government depend on the qualities of the human beings composing the society. Rules of procedure and justice,

though critically important, are inadequate without civic virtue and a high moral condition of the people. Mill addressed fears of instability and totalitarianism by requiring competent leadership to be combined with popular participation.

How can institutions provide good municipal administration if there exists such indifference to the subject that those who would administer honestly and capably cannot be induced to serve, and the duties are left to those who undertake them because they have some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail is the most broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care to choose the best Member of Parliament, but choose him who will spend most money to be elected? How can a representative assembly work for good if its members can be bought, or if their excitability of temperament, uncorrected by public discipline or private self-control, makes them incapable of calm deliberation, and they resort to manual violence on the floor of the House or shoot at one another with riffles? How, again, can government, or any joint concern, be carried on in a tolerable manner by a people so envious that, if one among them seems likely to succeed in anything, those who ought to co-operate with him form a tacit combination to make him fail? Whenever the general disposition of the people is such that each individual regards those only of his interest which are selfish, and does not dwell on or concern himself for, his share of the general interest, in such a state of things good government is impossible. (1958, 24-25)

Mill's warnings emphasize his belief that good government requires good people, both to serve as government officials and to act as the sovereign check on

government. Honest people cannot be convinced to serve in a political environment where the citizens are mainly self-interested and lack civic virtue. How would Mill create and maintain good government?

Mill's emphasis was comprehensive. Good government relies on popular participation and competent leadership. Thompson (1976), in his analysis of Mill's theory of representative government, calls these the two principles that make up Mill's good government. The principle of participation requires that citizens participate to the greatest extent possible. The principle of competence requires that the influence of the more qualified citizens should be as great as possible. Thompson wrote that Mill strongly emphasized participation but then constrained it with competence to promote good leadership and civic education. Conversely, participation develops competence in the people while checking the power of those in leadership. The greatest competence in government, as we saw earlier, will not lead to good government if the people lack civic virtue and interest. Good or bad government is not simply the responsibility of politicians or administrators. Good government requires a balanced

weaving of virtue, interest, skill and experience in those who serve and those who are sovereign.

Mill measured the goodness of government in two ways: first, "the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery"; and second, "the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs" (1958, 28). Mill believed that a government should be judged by its actions upon citizens, its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people, and its ability to perform good work for them and by means of them. Extensive participation both protected the interests of the citizens and provided a civic education to citizens. Competent leadership protected the citizens from ignorance in government as well as from corruption by private interests. Government should have a protective as well as an educative and transformative effect on the community. Obviously different from Bentham's simple happiness and self-interest principle, more than providing means to ends, government

has the unique responsibility of focusing on the well being of the people.

The Educative And Transformative Effect Of Popular Government

Mill explained: "there is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general" (1958, 42). Mill supported the notion of consent. Every citizen should have a voice in his or her government. He also believed it was important for citizens to "at least occasionally" perform some public function. He goes on to explain that the ideally best form of government, "in circumstances in which it is practical" is a "completely popular government" (1958, 43). Popular government "promotes a better and higher form of national character" (1958, 43).

The most important benefit of popular government is the education citizens receive when they take part in government. Popular government promotes civic interest, civic virtue and a civic morality that a more paternalistic type of government cannot.

Mill explained that participation in government gives the citizen a feeling of self-esteem and of belonging. But more important is the discipline learned "from the occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise, for a time, and in their turn some social function" (1958, 53). Mill believed that citizens had rights, but they also had responsibilities. One of their responsibilities in exercising their right to voice their interests is to recognize that their opinions and interests affect others. Mill explained that private citizens receive moral instruction through, even rare, participation that helps him or her to "weigh interests not his own". The citizen learns to think about conflicting interests in terms of the common good. During this participation, the citizen is usually exposed to "minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reason to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest" (1958,

54). Education takes place during exposure to those who have more experience, knowledge and skill with the subject and who can help the citizen to see the subject in terms of the common good, rather than his or her own personal interest.

Mill believed that anyone who received the protection of society owed something in return for the benefit and the right action of a citizen included making a contribution to society (1961a, 322). Mill said that there were certain things better done by individuals than by the government. "In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing as well, on the average, as the officers of the government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education--a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal" (1961a, 354).

The types of things Mill referred to include jury trial (and he stipulated that political cases are not included here); local and municipal government and industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary

association. These are activities that are "the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns--habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another" (1961a, 355). Mill believed that participation in civic life contributed to the education of a citizen. However, there was a range of public-oriented activities that could fulfill this need that did not necessarily include all aspects of government. Mill also limited the frequency and the duration of participation. It was not necessary that citizens participate on a regular basis. He used words such as, occasionally, in their turn, or performing some function. The point of public participation was to protect the interests of the people by giving them a voice in government, to educate them, and to open up their narrow self-interests by interacting with others in the community. Taking some responsibility for the maintenance of their popular government made the citizen feel that he or she was one of the public and that whatever benefited

the public also benefited him or her. This "public spirit" reinforced a sense of duty to society that went beyond submission and obedience to laws that characterized the more paternal governments.

The only government that could fulfill Mill's criteria of good government was one in which the "whole people participate," where "any participation, even the smallest public function is useful," and that all "share in the sovereign power of the state". But, Mill said, "since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative" (1958, 55).

Mill hoped that the political processes of representative government themselves would be one of several mechanisms which would work to improve the intellectual level of the citizenry (his first criteria of good government). He expected that the citizens would choose the best of themselves to represent them in government, that they would see the benefit of having their affairs managed by persons of greater knowledge and intelligence (1963, 316). These persons of greater knowledge and intelligence working in all branches of the

government would provide competent leadership and education, both by example and publicity. Publicity protects popular government and facilitates education by allowing observation and criticism and opening up the opportunity to exercise the liberty of public discussion (1958, 26).

"A representative constitution is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and honestly existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear upon the government, and investing them with greater influence in it than they would in general have under any other mode of organization" (1958, 27). A representative constitution, then, satisfies Mill's second criteria of good government: organizing the active worth already existing in the governed. Representative government contains within itself one of the cures for the characteristic disease of popular government: the political form itself will over time impart a degree of political intelligence to the citizenry.

Centrality Of Liberal, Constitutional, Limited Government

Mill believed that it was more important to preserve liberty for individuals through constitutional, limited government that was finally answerable to the citizen by giving them a participative voice in their government, than it was to have a pure democracy. His view of rule of law and the common good served the function which by this time had become usual or traditional in the theory of legitimate representative government: legitimate government must avoid arbitrariness and capriciousness, must depend upon regular publicly knowable order, procedure, and guarantees, and must strive to serve the common good rather than the good of special interests. Insofar as special interests or class interests might be unavoidable political motivators, arrangements should be structured so that the interests of the greatest number were predominant--though, individuals should always be heard. Mill held an enlightened concern that what is objectively best for the whole society could and should be possible.

Mill explained that "the struggle between liberty and authority is the most conspicuous feature in history" (1961a, 256). In most cases, this struggle took place between the individual and his or her government. In the

advancing state of democracy the people became the rulers and the individual discovered that the struggle was now between him or herself and the others in the community. "Self-government and the power of the people over themselves" did not reflect an accurate picture of democracy. It was not the "government of each by himself but of each by all the rest." The power of the vote enabled the individual to exercise his or her rights over personal concerns and also to impose them on others (1961a; 1963). The will of the people actually became defined as the will of the majority or, as Mill described it, those who work to make themselves the majority. This can include special or class interests. "The people" then, have the ability to "oppress a part of their number and precautions are as much needed against this as any other abuse of power" (1961a, 258).

Although Mill used representative government as a prescription for the dangers to democracy, it must be structured in such a way as to ameliorate these same dangers. "Even in representative democracy, absolute power, if they chose to exercise it, would rest with the numerical majority; and these would be composed exclusively

of a single class, alike in biases, prepossessions, and general modes of thinking" (1958, 127,128) .

Generally, when Mill wrote about the majority he referred to the masses of people who are undereducated, have little understanding of government and disregard the best interests of all for their own immediate interests. But, he also expressed a concern for any group that shares interests likes and dislikes, and who has the ability to make themselves a majority. Mill considered a class to be any number of persons who have the same "sinister interests". He defined sinister interests as interests that conflict with the general good of the community (1958, 92). Sinister interests are expected in a monarchy or aristocracy, but Mill said, we make a mistake to assume that the numerical majority would be free from this danger. When a sectional interest finds power, they prefer their own selfish interests to the interests of others. Mill warned:

All trust in constitutions is grounded on the assurance they may afford, not that depositions of power will not, but that they cannot, misemploy it. Democracy is not the ideally best form of government unless this weak side of it can be strengthened, unless it can be so organized that no class, not even the most numerous, shall be able to reduce all but itself to political insignificance and direct the course of legislation and administration by its

exclusive class interest. The problem is to find the means of preventing this abuse, without sacrificing the characteristic advantages of popular government (1958, 127,128).

Mill said that pure democracy is the government of the whole people by the whole people. Government by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented is a government of privilege giving the mere majority the only voice in the government (1958, 102,103). Mill agreed that the minority will and should be overruled during deliberations in the representative body, but he believed it was necessary for the minority to be heard. The minority can only be heard in the representative body if they have representatives. A minority should have a minority of representatives.

Mill explained that elections are structured in such a way that political parties present a moderate candidate who will have the greatest appeal to the majority. This candidate will have little distinction, and perhaps, weak abilities to govern. The candidate will actually represent only a few. Minorities with other concerns and interests will have no representation and may have no other choices. This kind of democracy, Mill said,

gives the power of government to not a majority, but a minority of the majority.

Mill suggested the "Hare Plan" be considered as an alternative that would give minorities more representation. This concept of election included interest representation rather than geographical representation and allowed the voter to choose several candidates, the number determined by dividing the number of voters by the number of seats. Voters could choose their favorite candidates from the entire group of candidates, "not merely from the assortment of two or three perhaps rotten oranges which may be the only choice offered to him in his local market" (1958, 111). Mill believed this type of election structure would provide a stronger tie between the elector and the representative. The Hare Plan was controversial and never really tried, but Mill's point was to improve opportunities for minorities.

Mill expressed the notion of consent by articulating two propositions which he held as axiomatic to representative government: no power should be exercised over any citizen who has not been consulted about its exercise, and each individual should have a vote which can be used to turn tyrannical representatives out of office.

In a popular government, the "rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them" (1958, 43). If a person is unable to stand up for his or her rights and interests, chances are they will not be recognized.

Society greatly benefits and prosperity is more diffused with the inclusion of more diversity of opinion, skill and experience. Mill believed that "in the absence of its natural defenders" the interests of those who are excluded from the process would be overlooked. No matter who are excluded or why they are excluded, their interests are left without representation. Those who are "reduced to plead from outside the door" are reduced to helplessness and miss the beneficial effects of freedom and privilege. Mill advocated universal suffrage and strongly disagreed with the exclusion of women and persons of color from the suffrage in any government.

Society itself also misses the benefits of diverse participation if some voices are overlooked. New and different ideas and views, "the antagonism of interests are the only real security for continued progress" (CRG, 34). In accordance with the view that no power should be

exercised over any citizen who has not been consulted about its exercise, and that each individual should have a vote which he or she can use to turn tyrannical representatives out of office, Mill's electoral would encompass the great mass of the citizenry. Yet, in his opinion, it is this widespread suffrage which leads toward "collective mediocrity" because it places the power of the community in the hands of masses who possess a low "standard of political intelligence."

Mill said that the natural tendency of modern civilization was toward a collective mediocrity produced by the move toward sameness of circumstances, thoughts, and ideas. Any increase of the franchise places power in the hands of classes below the highest level of instruction in the community (1958, 114). Since no superior class or institution of any strength from which the masses may receive their opinions exists in a democracy, and since superior wisdom is not appreciated, they receive their opinions and guidance from themselves, that is, from public opinion. Public opinion which demands conformity and which is intolerant of dissent is more effective a tyranny than despotic government because societal pressure is all pervasive and self-enforcing.

Recognizing that the minority would be outnumbered in representation, Mill again emphasized the importance of hearing their voice. Mill believed that most members of the community with superior intellect would not run for political offices. The only ones who would offer themselves would be those willing to "sacrifice their own opinions and modes of judgment, and become servile mouthpieces for their inferiors in knowledge" (1958, 114). Otherwise, candidates of excellence would have little chance of being elected. The moderate candidate responding to the interests of the masses would be the only candidate elected. This tyranny over opinion results in collective mediocrity: mediocrity in the masses of electors and consequent mediocrity in the governing body.

If the community could be assured that even a few of the greatest minds in the country were represented, the institution could serve the greatest social function in a democracy: the function of antagonism. A great difficulty of democratic government is how to provide a protection for opinions and interests with which the majority public opinion disagrees (1958, 117).

Mill's prescription for these problems is to support the greatest centrality of knowledge, skill and

technique necessary for sound, responsible government.

He does this through a structure of functionally differentiated governing elites that will be described in the next chapter. Layering political society with competent leadership leads the way to protection of all opinions and interests and to meaningful popular participation.

CHAPTER V
GOVERNING ELITES:
MILL'S STRUCTURE FOR BALANCING PARTICIPATION AND COMPETENCE
IN GOVERNMENT

Mill consistently advanced the combination of competent leadership and an active, virtuous public for good government. Government will improve in quality and excellence "where the officers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous and enlightened public opinion" (1958, 25). The government which best promotes the virtue and intelligence of the people will likely be the best type of government in other respects. Mill believed that representative government, properly administered, would be the best means of improving the people and giving the wisest members of society the greatest influence.

Mill did not think that government itself was bad, but that it could be organized badly. Poorly

constructed institutions could lower the morality and deaden the intelligence of the people. The best popular government is the one "which most widely diffuses the exercise of public functions" (1958, 28). But, government is defective if it does not concentrate sufficient power and authority in the hands of the officers of government.

Conflicting influences are necessary. Mill said that pursuit of one apart from the other ends in the decay and loss of both. Government needs both competence and participation. "Government by trained officials cannot do for a country the things which can be done by a free government" and conversely, "freedom cannot produce its best effects, and often breaks down altogether, unless means can be found of combining it with trained and skilled administration" (1958, 91). He continued, "one of the most important ends of political institutions [is] to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other", attempting to balance conflicting influences to preserve both. A combination should be found that makes compatible, "the great advantage of the conduct of affairs by skilled persons, bred to it as an intellectual profession, along with that of a general control vested in,

and seriously exercised by, bodies representative of the entire people" (1958, 91).

Mill believed a line could be drawn separating work that should be performed by skilled and knowledgeable persons and the work of watching, selecting, and when necessary, controlling, the governors. "No progress at all can be made toward obtaining a skilled democracy unless the democracy are willing that the work which requires skill should be done by those who possess it" (1958, 91). Mill argued for the necessity of functionally differentiated governing elites. There are different kinds of political tasks to be performed in a representative government and the people who are best fitted to the various tasks, Mill believed, ought to be placed in the appropriate positions and allowed to perform as their ability dictates subject only to broad constraints.

The divisions of Mill's polity begin with the electorate. Mill advocated universal suffrage, giving everyone the opportunity to vote. A portion of that electorate constitutes the first of Mill's governing elite. The elites were divided into three categories: 1) The educated citizen, 2) the wise representative, and 3) the skilled bureaucrat. Mill explained the roles and

responsibilities of each of these elites and the relationship among them keeping in mind his interest in balancing the necessary concepts of participation and competence in government. He had a fairly consistent idea of how each subset of the polity related to the next. This structure gave Mill's theory its comprehensive nature.

The First Elite: The Educated Citizen

Participation is a vital component in Mill's theory of government and voting is one of the most important responsibilities of a citizen. "Representative institutions are of little value and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds but sell them for money or vote at the beck of someone who has control over them" (1958, 8). Mill believed voting was a moral duty to be taken seriously. He felt so strongly about it that he argued for public voting.

Voting in private, or by ballot, he feared, would give the citizen the idea that the vote was for himself rather than for the good of the community. Voting, like

any other public duty, should be open to the criticism of the public. Mill realized that public voting could create other problems, but he believed that in a free society, they should be minimal (1958, 157).

Voting was not a right as we commonly define a right. He explained that we have a right to our house. It belongs to us; there is no need to consult the public about whether we sell it. The vote is different. It gives a person power over others and no one has a right to that power. Instead, voting is a moral responsibility, a trust. Whether one is an elector or a representative, the power given is one of trust.

In political elections the voter has a moral obligation to consider the interest of the public and to use his or her best judgment in casting the vote, as if he or she were the only voter and the outcome of the election depended on one vote. A citizen must give his or her vote according to his or her "best and most conscientious opinion of the public good" (1958, 155).

Mill also believed that a citizen should not be forced to vote, and that voting should not be made too easy. A person who was indifferent to voting showed little concern for others and even little concern for self. In

that case, it may be better to prevent him or her from voting.

The voter who does not care enough about the election to go to the poll, is the very man who, if he can vote without that small trouble, will give his vote to the first person who asks for it... A man who does not care whether he votes, is not likely to care much which way he votes; and he who is in that state of mind has no moral right to vote at all; since if he does so, a vote which is not the expression of a conviction, counts for as much, and goes as far in determining the result as one which perhaps represents the thoughts and purposes of a life (1963, 33)

Instead of fostering patriotism, civic education and a sense of public duty, indifference to voting robs the interested citizen of the power of his or her thoughtful vote. Taking an active interest in politics is the first step to elevating the individual from a narrow perspective. The exercise of the electoral trust is the primary instrument of moral and intellectual training.

Mill believed that every person should have a voice in government for its value as an instrument of training and "to have his consent asked and his opinion counted at its worth, though not at more than its worth" (1958, 131). It was a completely different question, to Mill, whether everyone ought to have an equal voice. Voting was a trust of power and Mill thought that all persons could not have an equal claim to this power (1963, 315).

The qualifications for exercise of this trust would not be equal as long as all are not equal in worth as human beings. Putting aside consideration of moral worth, because it is not easily measured, Mill looked at intellectual worth. One person is not as good as another; a person who cannot read, is not as good as one who can. Mill believed that everyone would rather have his or her affairs managed by a person of greater knowledge and intelligence than by one of less (1963, 316). The majority of humanity, including rulers, must consult and sometimes defer to those who have the authority of knowledge. Mill explained that as a member of Parliament, he consulted those who had more knowledge and skill in the details of certain subjects than he. Those who have "applied their minds most carefully" should have the opportunity to influence those who are unable to spend as much time in careful study (1957a, 136, 192).

He added that this is not a justification for slavery or dependence. Subjection of one class to another is always detrimental to both. The plurality of votes, based on education, should stop short of enabling the more educated to make decisions for their own class. Mill considered it absolutely necessary that even the poorest

individual in the community be allowed to show that he or she is qualified for plural votes.

Mill admitted that he did not have a good plan for establishing a system of plural voting, but offered some suggestions. An unskilled laborer could be given one vote, while a skilled laborer may be given two. He continued the list up to persons who have the highest levels of education being given five or six votes. There would be fewer persons with the highest levels of education and many more unskilled laborers, so that ideally, the vote would work out equally according to group interests. Here, the votes of the highly educated minority would count more than they would under other circumstances. This combined with the opportunity to vote by interest rather than by geographic location would change the electoral process.

Mill would exclude persons in some conditions of life from exercising the vote for a period of time. First, welfare recipients should be excluded as long as they are dependent on the remaining members of the community. Next, the person who has filed bankruptcy is excluded until his or her debts are paid. And last, those who have willfully not paid taxes should be disqualified. Mill said that these persons either have not cared to fulfill their

responsibilities or are in a "general condition of depression and degradation" which would, in either case, keep the person from conscientiously exercising their trust. All could be admitted back into the suffrage as soon as they have emerged from their disqualifying condition (1958, 134,135).

Whoever wishes to exercise power over others must acquire the necessary qualifications. Everyone should have a vote, "but this does not imply that everyone should have it unconditionally." Mill's plan did require that the conditions would be such that all could fulfill them. They could not be based on different levels of income or property other than whether they depended on other members for subsistence as welfare recipients or bankrupts. It would be necessary that society made education available to all persons, either free or at an expense that the poorest could afford. Society must not neglect two solemn obligations: universal education and universal enfranchisement. This way, only an individual's indifference to voting would prevent him or her from voting.

Mill believed his plan would increase the interest in and the value of the vote. It could be understood as an

exercise of public trust. The vote would be not an option, but the moral duty of a citizen. The citizenry then, is divided into three categories: 1) Those who cannot vote because of temporary disqualifications, 2) those who have the vote, and 3) those who have earned plural votes because of higher education. The last group, the educated citizen, is the first elite in political society and should be given the opportunity to use their knowledge to influence political decisions for the good of the whole public.

The education of the people, plural voting, and the opinion leadership and influence of the more intelligent and informed citizens would, he thought, give an enlightened tone to the electorate, but the wisdom of the citizenry would consist primarily in willingness to choose and to be ruled by the best among them. The electors' duty and interest is to select the wisest person available and then to let the wisest govern; thus the elected representatives constitute what might be called the second elite.

The Second Elite: The Wise Representative

Mill believed that it was critically important that the electors should choose wiser people than themselves to represent them and should consent to being governed according to that superior wisdom (1958, 179).

Representatives should be chosen from among the people, but should be carefully chosen from among those who possess the benefits of superior intellect, and who have shown long dedication and practical discipline to the special task of governing (satisfying the second prerequisite of good government--to organize the best already available). Representatives should be chosen to reflect diverse opinions in the legislature in order to secure the necessary antagonism of interests needed for progressive, responsible government and to ensure that all voices are heard. Diverse modes of thinking have a better chance of being represented by the wisest among the people (1958, 178).

Mill believed that the important requisite to choosing the best among the people was a societal deference to mental superiority. Optimistically, Mill thought that people who appreciated the value of superior wisdom would be likely to recognize it and choose it even, perhaps, over

their own opinions. Considerable differences of opinion would not stop sensible persons from choosing representatives wiser than themselves.

However, Mill recognized that "democracy is not favorable to the reverential spirit" (1958, 180). While one of the benefits of democracy is that it does not reverence social position, its insistence on equality also eliminates reverence to superior wisdom. Similarly, the essence of democracy, that all are entitled to be considered equally, tends to encourage the person who thinks that no one else's opinion is better than his or her own. This type of person will not elect anyone who does not profess to agree with his or her sentiments and will be quick to remove a representative who does not react accordingly (1958, 180).

Representative government can be a system of delegation if the electors choose to do so. Mill said that as long as they are free to vote or not to vote and to vote as they like, they can make any candidate conform to their wishes. But, if an elector attempts to influence the representative to do as the elector wishes rather than as the representative's superior understanding and information tell him or her is best, the citizen misunderstands the

citizen's own interest. Mill thought that substitution of delegation for representation was a serious danger of democracy. He recalled Tocqueville's study of the United States which found that Americans often nullify the securities of representative government by imposing a plan of conduct on their representative (1961b, xxxii).

The voter has a moral duty to select the best persons as representatives and to expect these individuals to govern according to their own wisdom and opinion rather than according to the voter's. Mill explained:

Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use if they do not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study: and if it be an object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to average electors, it must be counted upon that the representative will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftenest right of the two (1958, 176)

The representatives, for their part, have a moral duty to remain true to their own judgment. This is the trust that is given when electors choose a representative wiser than themselves.

A citizen must recognize those who are more qualified than themselves to govern. The decision to re-elect or remove a representative should be based on the

candidate's qualifications rather than simply adherence to the elector's personal opinion. Mill said the first sign of a good representative is actual public service that shows the candidate to have fulfilled their position well:

To have filled posts of magnitude and done important things in them, of which the wisdom has been justified by the results; to have been the author of measures which appear from their effects to have been wisely planned; to have made predictions which have been often verified by the event, seldom or never falsified by it; to have given advice which when taken has been followed by good consequences, when neglected, by bad. (1958, 181)

Although these signs do not guarantee continuing wisdom in the representative, they are guidelines for the elector who wishes to make the best choice. Mill explained that "men, as well as women, do not need political rights in order that they may govern, but in order that they may not be misgoverned" (1958, 143).

Electors must be active, interested citizens to apply these guidelines to their representatives, to be sure that they are being governed wisely, and to know when they have been misgoverned. The process of election if taken as a duty and a civic trust will teach the elector to recognize superior wisdom and ability for governing (first prerequisite of good government--to improve the people).

Mill draws a line where the elector's deference to mental superiority causes them to give up all personal opinion. Representatives should be responsible to the elector. They can not govern without any reference to the elector's opinion. Active and interested citizens will have convictions on some matters that are fundamental to his or her existence or to the existence of the political society. These convictions in individuals are entitled to be heard and if they are convictions of any large portion of the people are entitled to influence. "A people cannot be well governed in opposition to their primary notions of right, even though these may be in some points erroneous" (1958, 183). Electors should not be expected to consent to be governed in opposition to their fundamental beliefs.

The question of whether or not a representative should become a delegate, or a "mere mouthpiece" of the elector, for Mill, is one of constitutional morality. Constitutional morality, he explained, is a system of ethics in government. It is the traditional understanding of the use of power. Constitutional morality is critical in unbalanced governments such as pure monarchy, pure aristocracy and pure democracy to restrain the strongest powers from excesses (1958, 68, 176). This is not

constitutional law, for the law gives the greatest power to one body in unbalanced governments. It is an understanding that this power will not be used arbitrarily. Mill saw representative government as a mixed-government that approached balance. However, "the scales never hang exactly even", a strongest power always exists in every constitution (1958, 69). In representative government the ultimate sovereign power lies with the people.

A popular constitution can only be balanced by a positive political morality. Continuous tests of strength do not make a constitution effective. An attempt must be made toward harmony in government. Mill recognized that the ultimate power resides in the people, but warned them from using it without just cause. The power of a popular constitution lies in the majority, but if each part of the government is not allowed to do their job, "the Constitution would not possess the stability which characterizes it" (1958, 69).

Whether electors should require their representatives to be their delegate or to use their superior wisdom and experience to make judgments for the public good is a question of constitutional morality rather than law. It concerns the state of mind that the electors

ought to bring to the exercise of their public trust, the ideas that should prevail as to the moral duties of an elector.

What is the public trust given to the representatives? Representatives of the people, the voice of the people, hold the practical supremacy in a popular constitution. Mill thought their role and responsibility was to talk, publicize, deliberate, discuss, present diverse views, be the nation's "Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions" (1958, 82). He explained:

The office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power and security enough for the liberty of the nation. (1958, 81)

The most important duty of the representative assembly is to facilitate public discourse. This includes publicizing the activities of all parts of government. Publicity allows the people to observe and criticize government. Popular government relies on active, educated and interested citizens. Public discourse contributes to

the sense of political community by pulling participants away from self-interest and revealing their connection to the good of the community.

Public discussion of ideas and opinions, Mill believed, contributed to good government. "Men, and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty" (1961a, 271). Public discussion contributed to good decisions in light of uncertainty by giving voice to all opinions. Mill believed that conflicting opinions could share the truth between them and even the wisest in the community could benefit from hearing these conflicts. Bringing together opinions of average persons and those of genius and originality improved public discourse and enhanced the possibility of good decision-making.

As the nation's "Committee of Grievances" and its "Congress of Opinions" the representative assembly can perform no more useful function than to be "a place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions" (1958, 82). Mill said that talking and discussion were their proper business while doing, as the result of discussion,

is the proper business of those specially trained to it. The representative assembly is fit to see that those individuals who are trained to "do" are honestly and intelligently chosen and "then to interfere no further with them except by unlimited latitude of suggestion and criticism, and by applying or withholding the final seal of national assent" (1958, 83).

The Third Elite: The Skilled Bureaucrat

Mill explained that there was a radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it (1958, 70). Mill calls our attention to certain deficiencies in the representative body. Governing, according to Mill, consisted of two things: legislating and administering. A representative body whose responsibility it was to control the business of government was in his opinion not fit to do either aspect of actual governing. Mill's discussion of the actual governors--whom we might consider the third elite--was quite extensive.

Mill found that the "essence and meaning of bureaucracy" was when "the work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession" (1958, 89). The excellence of bureaucracy for him was the fact that public

business is the primary occupation of a given group especially trained for governing. Governing properly is an art, and it is not an art that one knows instinctively, but rather requires training, skill, and devotion.

Mill's bureaucracy of actual governors included a legislative commission. Here it is possible to see Bentham's continued influence on Mill. Bentham worked for reform and the codification of laws believing that they had not been logically and comprehensively considered. Mill agreed with Bentham's views on this subject and argued for special competence in law making. He held that when a representative body tries to legislate, it does not do so adequately because the work necessary to construct sound laws must be performed by minds trained in legal study and experienced in constructing legal devices. Such knowledge and experience is technical, and though the second elite may be the electoral intellectual cream, it still would not necessarily have this technical ability.

A law must be "framed with the most accurate and long-sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions; and the law when made should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing laws" (1958, 77). Mill found that this was

impossible when laws were voted on clause by clause as the assembly did. He did not believe that the assembly could possibly prepare a bill that dealt with any subject in its entirety because of the conditions and pressure of time under which a representative body functions. And, Mill said, even if they tried, by the time it came out of committee essential clauses would be omitted and incongruous ones inserted to please either a private interest or "some crotchety member who threatens to delay the bill" (1958, 78). The final law would then need an amendment in the next session to correct the mischievous "tinkering."

Mill hoped that the representative body would acknowledge that legislation required better qualities than "a fluent tongue and the faculty of getting elected by a constituency" (1958, 78). The only competency the representative body possesses in legislation as well as administration is "causing it to be done; determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed" (1958, 79).

The legislation which a representative body produces is "impromptu," designed to meet present

exigencies, and "not in pursuance of a general design". A legislative bureaucracy could do away with many of the faults of "ignorant and ill considered legislation". A small body of trained personnel would draw up laws on its own initiative and also such measures as the representatives might wish drawn up. This legislative body would be responsible to protect the existing whole law, making sure that new laws would fit with previously existing laws and that the long-sighted focus would be maintained.

The representative body would have the option of enacting the legislation as written, rejecting it, or sending it back for reconsideration and improvement, but the representative body should not "tinker" with it with their "clumsy hands" (1958, 78). Mill explained that this legislative body would have no power of enacting laws, only the responsibility to use skill and knowledge in their construction. "The most important liberty of the nation, that of being governed only by laws assented to by its elected representatives, would be fully preserved and made more valuable" (1958, 81).

In Mill's view, a representative body cannot administer properly either. The question of training in

technical skills enters into administration even more obviously than into legislating. "Every branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has its own peculiar principles and traditional rules" (1958, 72). Mill add here that he does not mean to imply that public administration "has esoteric mysteries, only to be understood by the initiated" (1958, 72). The principles of administration are understandable to anyone who studies them, but they do not come by intuition. Moreover, there is the question of the organization requisite to good administration--according to Mill, administration is best carried on under the responsibility of a single person. A representative assembly is not only unfit for administration in the sense that a large body obviously cannot conduct the business of running departments, it is also unfit for directing in detail those administrators who do run the departments.

An administrative bureaucracy, Mill argued, could wisely and efficiently take care of all the details of "doing." A bureaucracy could apply the principles of public administration to the actual governing of the state; it could be above partisan or sinister interests and

internally ordered on merit principles with clear lines of responsibility.

In keeping with the thesis that "government is skilled employment" Mill described the recruitment of the bureaucrats in terms of the identification of intelligence, education, and thus potential governmental skill (1958, 199). He recognized the bureaucracy as the "large and important body which constitutes the permanent strength of the public service" (1958, 206). The qualifications for the discharge of these duties are special and professional. Appointments should be made carefully and thoughtfully by those who share some of the qualifications and have experience themselves rather than by political representatives.

Candidates for entrance into the bureaucracy were to be selected in competitive examinations administered by "persons not engaged in politics" (1958, 207). The examinations should not be simply pass or fail, but should differentiate between degrees of candidates so that the best qualified candidates could be employed. Mill believed that these examinations should go beyond testing for technical expertise. The best qualified candidate should be educated in the liberal arts and have a "general mental

cultivation" that shows an interest in learning and the ability to grasp ideas outside of a narrow technical perspective.

Once in the bureaucracy, civil servants should enjoy the security of employment and be susceptible to dismissal only for cause. Cause included more than just breaking the law, but "neglect of duty or conduct implying untrustworthiness for the purposes of which their trust is given them" (1958, 206). Functionaries should never be expected to resign with the political appointees, nor should political appointees be able to remove a functionary from employment. Mill believed that high level functionaries should be both responsible for the selection of the best candidates chosen by competition and should be the sole person empowered to remove the subordinate.

Mill said, "it would be vain to expect that the body of persons by whom the whole detail of the public business is transacted, and whose qualifications are generally of much more importance to the public than those of the minister himself, will devote themselves to their profession and acquire the knowledge and skill on which the minister must often place entire dependence if they are liable at any moment to be turned adrift for no fault, that

the minister may gratify himself or promote his political interest by appointing somebody else" (1958, 200). Mill clearly believed that the skill and experience of those in the public service were critical to governing. Those in the representative body were not only unqualified to recognize these skills and to choose the best candidate, but they should not have the opportunity to end someone's career for political reasons.

Measures for promotion should be a combination of seniority and merit. Those who perform routine duties that limit opportunities to stand out, should be promoted by seniority as long as they perform those duties well. The chief of the office should promote those who hold positions of responsibility and special skill according to merit. Mill believed that if the original appointment were made by open competition, the chief would generally promote the fittest person; the one who would be the most useful to him or her. Mill acknowledged that occasionally, a political promotion may take place, but generally, under this system, the chief would prefer someone who helped build a reputation for good public management since the credit always goes to the chief rather than the subordinates (1958, 212).

Mill included a discussion of the selection of the chief magistrate or President, and the selection of judicial officers. In both cases, Mill believed that the United States was wrong to select these positions by popular election. Mill boldly observed that "since the last survivor of the founders, the United States hasn't had a President with any expertise in politics" (1958, 200). Political parties, rather than offering the candidate with the most expertise, offer the candidate with the fewest enemies. Another consequence that comes with the popular election of the President is that the whole intervening time between elections is spent in "electioneering". "The President, ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers, are all electioneers: the whole community is kept intent on the mere personalities of politics, and every public question is discussed and decided with less reference to its merits than to its expected bearing on the presidential election" (1958, 210, 202). Mill admitted that this was a difficult and complex question and though he understood the importance of checking powers in the United States, he believed the price paid for this check was well beyond its advantage.

The subject of choosing judicial officers was even more important. Mill did not believe that the general public was able to make informed judgments about the conduct and qualifications of a judge. Judges that could be removed by popular vote would feel like they risked their job on every decision they made. Therefore, decisions would be made based on public passion and prejudice rather than on what was just (1958, 205). While the general public should have the opportunity to remove any public figure who violated their trust, Mill strongly believed this opportunity should be rarely exercised. He said that "the irremovability of any public officer, to whom great interests are entrusted, is in itself an evil" (1958, 206).

Mill wrote specifically about organization, accountability and responsibility in public administration. To ensure the greatest accountability, he said that every executive function should be the responsibility of an individual. His stress on publicity in government intensified in executive departments. He believed it should be completely apparent who performed every task, made every decision, and who neglected their duty. Mill continued to refer to every function in government, whether

representing the people, the responsibility of a citizen, or the permanent public service as a trust. A trust carried responsibility and required openness.

There is no responsibility when no one knows who is responsible. When more than one person is responsible for the same act, Mill said, when a wrong is done, though each will be held responsible, each can excuse him or herself because others were involved. Again, he referred to the influence of Bentham who said that boards are screens. Mill explained that "what the board does is the act of nobody" (1958, 196). Boards generally deliberate in private so that nobody knows how any member voted. The board is only held responsible as a collective. No individual member feels responsibility except as he or she is associated with the board. While this makes boards unfit to conduct executive business, they can be used as counselors or advisors so long as one person remains responsible for the final decision.

Mill, again, works toward balance and consistency by admonishing the individual who uses no knowledge but his or her own to make decisions. Here, Mill used the example of the political appointee who may have an understanding of the general interests of the country but will not usually

have adequate professional knowledge needed to run the department. Professional, expert advisors and a staff of clerks should supply knowledge of the details needed to make responsible decisions. Mill insisted on a body of advisors, providing a variety of opinions rather than a single advisor. Additionally, advisors must always keep records of what they have advised and what reasons they had for giving that advice. These records must be available to be produced on the request of the representatives or by public opinion. This access and publicity, Mill believed would motivate advisors to form and express well-considered opinions as if they were responsible for the decisions themselves (1958, 199).

Mill wrote in surprising detail about issues of organization. But, his focus was on accountability and responsibility around competence in government rather than the principles of good management. Recalling that Mill served as both a bureaucrat and a politician, he had direct experience with the problems in both groups and in their relationship with each other. Mill's discussion of organizational issues reiterated his themes of publicity, education, skill, and balance.

In Mill's discussion of bureaucracy, he continued to limit the proper functions of the representative body and explained the important reasons for separating the functions of the representatives from the administrators. Mill said that representative bodies tend to interfere in the details of administration (1958, 76). Interference in administrative detail is dangerous because it is almost always "injurious". Mill believed that it was widely understood that representative bodies should not administer. He explained that representatives, for example, are responsible for voting on taxes, however, they should never be responsible for preparing the estimates (1958, 71).

Public administration relies on skill, principles and traditional rules (1958, 72). Only those who have been trained to it and have experience implementing the principles and rules can make good judgments about its details. Mill, always an advocate for the infusion of new ideas, understood that it was occasionally necessary to throw out traditional rules and principles and try something else. However, only those who thoroughly knew the principles and had common experience with them were

capable of judging the circumstance that required a departure from them.

A representative assembly does not have the knowledge or experience to decide special acts or details of administration. "At its best, it is inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on knowledge-- ignorance which, never suspecting the existence of what it does not know, is equally careless and supercilious, making light of, if not resenting, all pretensions to have a judgment better worth attending to than its own" (1958, 73). Mill was always concerned with ignorance. Recall that Mill believed the skill of the representative was facilitating public discourse.

Aside from injurious administrative errors that could be caused by the inexperienced representative assembly, Mill warned of a more serious danger. When members of the representative assembly interfering in administration are representing strong private interests, the opportunity can result in jobbery and corruption more dangerous than when it takes place in a public office by administrators. When administrators engage in corrupt activities the representative assembly who is responsible for publicity and checking the work of the actual governors

can remove them from office. But, Mill asks, who will check the corrupt administrative interference of the representative assembly? "A minister, a head of an office, feels himself under some responsibility. An assembly in such cases feels under no responsibility at all; for when did any member of Parliament lose his seat for the vote he gave on any detail of administration" (1958, 74)? Mill points out that administrators are more concerned with how his or her actions will look in the long run, but the representative is more concerned with the public moment. "An assembly never personally experiences the inconveniences of its bad measures until they have reached the dimensions of national evils. Ministers and administrators see them approaching, and have to bear all the annoyance and trouble of attempting to ward them off" (1958, 74).

This does not mean that representatives should have no voice in administrative affairs. Representatives are useful for administrative business as advisors, as a voice for popular interests, as a body that represents all opinions relating to public matters. Most importantly, representatives are responsible for checking, criticizing,

giving final approval or withdrawing approval of public business.

Nothing but the restriction of the function of representative bodies within these rational limits will enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction with the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as human affairs increase in scale and in complexity) of skilled legislation and administration. There are no means of combining these benefits except by separating the functions which guarantee the one from those which essentially require the other; by disjoining the office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while securing for the latter, under strict responsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practiced intelligence of a specially trained and experienced Few. (1958, 83-84)

Mill separated the functions of representative bodies from the legislative and administrative bureaucracy striving "to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other" (1958, 91). He admitted that determining the point where as much of one is consistent with the other is a difficult question. The answer is not the same for every state. He emphasized throughout his writing on representative government that the actual formulation of representative government depended on the level of advancement of the people. Still, he suggested a practical principle: "the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the

greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the center" (1961a, 359).

Mill was not blind to the faults of bureaucracy, but he was optimistic about the correction of such faults by representative government. Representative government and bureaucracy were viewed as mutually corrective of their respective faults and dangers. Perhaps the gravest problem of bureaucracy within representative government is that of control, accountability, or responsibility. Mill recognized this and he expressed deep concern that experts ultimately be responsible to the governed through the representatives as often as he argued that they must be allowed to do their job unhampered by the interference of amateurs. This is the same paradox of ability yet responsibility, of autonomy yet accountability, which pervades all of Mill's theory. Representative government and bureaucracy are in a sense antagonistic interests but accepting this role is security for continued progress (1958, 34). In the next chapter, we will continue to examine the paradox, antagonism, and the reconciliation of bureaucracy within popular government.

CHAPTER VI

BUREAUCRACY WITHIN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: BALANCING COMPETENCE AND PARTICIPATION

We have seen the important components of the foundation of Mill's theory and the structure he built among governing elites to balance competence and participation. In this chapter, we will begin to see how Mill's work contributes to current public administration dialogue by examining his plan for the relationship among the subsets of his polity. Then, we will see how Mill balanced competence and participation by looking at his example of the concepts working together on the local government level.

Mill viewed popular representation and bureaucracy as equally necessary but antagonistic components of government that would be mutually corrective of their respective faults and dangers. Rather than eliminate or minimize one or the other, Mill valued the differences in each subset of government for their ability to contribute

different skills to recognizing, deciding on, and implementing the public good. The subsets of Mill's polity served to check each other but also required the development of a relationship of mutual respect for skills and responsibilities. I have used Mill's discussion of constitutional morality to describe the relationship he believed would create wholeness, balance, and inclusion for his ideal government.

Constitutional Morality

Mill structured this relationship emphasizing the roles of competence and participation among the subsets of the polity in a system of trust, or constitutional morality. Constitutional morality is not law, but it is a system of ethics or understanding in government that regulates the use of power. Its purpose is to restrain the strongest powers in government from excessive and arbitrary use of their power while allowing the different components of government to use their skill, experience, and knowledge to govern (1958, 68, 176). This understanding defines the boundaries of the relationship among the subsets of the polity. Constitutional morality within representative government recognizes that the ultimate sovereign power

lies with the people. But, in order to achieve good government, different kinds of political tasks must be performed well. The people who are best fitted to do the various tasks ought to be placed in the appropriate positions and allowed to perform as their ability dictates, subject only to broad constraints.

Constitutional morality concerns the state of mind which electors, representatives, and bureaucrats ought to bring to the exercise of their public trust; the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties of their position in the polity. Whether electors should require their representatives to be their delegates or allow them to use their superior wisdom and experience to make judgments for the public good is a question of constitutional morality rather than law. The relationship between the representatives and the bureaucracy is regulated by the same constitutional morality. The representatives should see that qualified people are chosen to do the work of government, should watch and control them, but should not "tinker" in their work with their "clumsy hands" (1958, 78).

The popular assembly holds the ultimate power of the people, but it is critical to stable government that they

know the difference between what they can do well and what they should have done by others. Citizens give a certain amount of discretion to their representatives based on their qualifications for the job. Representatives give similar discretion to bureaucracy based on their qualifications. This concept contains Mill's paradox of ability yet responsibility, of autonomy yet accountability.

Mill's theory of government required each subset to perform their special duties responsibly and accountably and for each subset to be a check on the other (Table 1). Citizens were responsible for assessing information for informed public deliberation in order to identify and re-identify the public good. They were then responsible for using their vote as a public trust to give their consent or to withhold their consent to government. Informed and responsible monitoring of their elected representatives was one of the important roles of the citizen.

Mill explained that representatives were best at talking and deliberating. Consequently, their main responsibility was to facilitate public deliberation to identify and re-identify the public good. Their second responsibility was to select persons to do the "work of

government" and to watch, check and give final consent to bureaucratic work.

(Table 1) Special Responsibilities within Constitutional
Morality

<u>CITIZENS</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVES</u>	<u>BUREAUCRACY</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voting as a public trust • Give consent to government by affirming and re-affirming through voting • Accessing information for informed deliberation • Taking part in public deliberation to identify and re-identify the public good • Informed and responsible monitoring of elected representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate public deliberation to identify and re-identify the public good • Informed and responsible decision making concerning public policy • Watch, check, and publicize the work of the bureaucracy • Give final consent to bureaucratic work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perform the actual work of the government based on the politically defined public good • Provide specialized feedback to representatives and citizens to inform the policy process • Monitor policy deliberations and representative and citizen actions for consistency with long-term public interest

The bureaucracy, performing the actual "work of government" was responsible for providing specialized

feedback to representatives and citizens so that they were able to make better informed policy decisions. The bureaucracy was to monitor policy deliberations and decisions for their consistency with the long-term public interest and for their ability to fit into the comprehensive scheme of political, cultural, and social values.

Each subset in Mill's polity would be checked by publicity (including citizen activity in government) and all elected or appointed government officials would be ultimately removable if any betrayed their trust. This relationship of constitutional morality required that an interested and responsible citizen, the "mainspring" of the whole political system, possess the civic virtue needed to fulfill their public trust.

Mill believed that a popular constitution could only be balanced by a positive political morality that would produce harmony in government. Continuous tests of strength make a constitution ineffective. Mill recognized that the ultimate power resided in the people, but warned them from using it without just cause. The power of a popular constitution lies in the majority, but if each part

of the government is not allowed to do its job, "the Constitution would not possess the stability which characterizes it" (1958, 69). Constitutional morality holds together the relationship among antagonistic components and gives them room to work harmoniously. Constitutional morality gives Mill's theory of government its "positive" and whole nature, separating functions of government, providing checks and balances, and calling for all subsets of government, including bureaucracy, to act together to fulfil their responsibility and create good government.

Constitutive Institution

The purpose of combining competence and participation within this relationship that recognizes special roles and responsibilities is to create good government. Mill's theory provided normative guidelines for the quality of government. Returning to Mill's two criteria of good government: "the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually" and "the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist and make them instrumental to the right purposes," Mill emphasized the

importance of the quality of the "machinery" itself in achieving these two criteria (1958, 25). "The government is at once a great influence acting on the human mind and a set of organized arrangements for public business" (1958, 28). The institution of government, to Mill, is both constitutive and instrumental.

Cook (1996) divided the functions and responsibilities of government into instrumental and constitutive roles. His characterization of the institutional role of government fits well with Mill's. It describes the difficulties that arise when government is seen as only a means to an end. A government's instrumental roles are concerned with means-end rationality. This concept focuses on human wants and satisfaction and is mainly economic and market driven. Cook explained that looking at government from this perspective leads the public to expect government to function as "instruments of individual welfare" (1996, 3). In this role, political institutions engaged in making and implementing public policy are focused upon allocation decisions defined in terms of means and ends, or on achieving predetermined goals with economic effectiveness. Citizens, then, evaluate the success or failure of

government based on how much they as individuals have gained or lost, usually measured by economic standards (King & Stivers, 1998). This individual focus overlooks the effects on society as a whole. Public agencies are simplified into problem solving and service delivery industries (Cook, 1996).

The constitutive aspect of political institutions is important. Focusing only on the instrumental functions of government makes government simply a distributor of resources to be evaluated in terms of economic and commercial measurements. From this perspective, citizens are seen in terms of the selfishness of possessive individualism, rather than their ability to develop the civic virtue and morality needed for citizenship. They are not expected to choose the public interest over their own desires. Much of the current public administration literature condemns this seemingly inherent economic focus built into the American political system and criticizes the simplicity of a completely instrumental focus for the role of public administration (Box, 1998; King & Stivers, 1998; McSwite, 1997; Wamsley, et al., 1990; Morgan, 1990).

Mill's concept of progress, of improving the people, and the development of society, was not one of

simply economic ends. Recall that Mill criticized the economic focus of utility and called for a philosophy of human progress based on moral and intellectual advancement. For Mill, government had a higher purpose than improving the economic state of the people. The common good could be found in terms of the maintenance and improvement of society. Focusing on wealth and prosperity and ignoring the need for philosophical advances to accompany prosperity would create an unbalanced society. Mill said that the unbalanced influence of commercial interest was the most serious danger to the future of mankind (1961c, xlix). Mill believed that government had the ability and the responsibility to help citizens develop larger interests.

Cook (1996) suggested that public institutions have a larger social responsibility as a constitutive or formative contributor to society. Institutions are the structures of society that maintain, and reproduce cultural values and traditions (Terry, 1995; Burke, 1994; Kass, 1990; Wamsley, et.al., 1990). Society's norms are acted out and also created by the interactions of human beings within their institutions. People become citizens through their roles within these social constructions and it is here that societal change takes place. As such, government

cannot be separated from the people as an independent entity or as something to be "run".

Hummel and Stivers (1998, 29) critically argue that citizens can not be who they are or be fully human unless people and government are one. From an institutional perspective, society's institutions and people are in a sense "one", creating and recreating cultural values and norms. Human beings create their culture through societal structures or institutions. The form of those institutions develops from the interactions of citizens, both negative and positive. Thus, our institutions do not always reflect the best in human behavior and values but they do reflect our experiences with others. Follet (1924) explained that the will of the people could be found in experience and in situations. This will is created and recreated in social institutions.

The institution of public administration has the special responsibility to correct society's negative interactions or to be advocates for particular groups who are underrepresented or mistreated according to some writers (Wamsley, et. al., 1990; Fredrick, 1990). Mill hoped that choosing leadership from the best in society would increase the potential for minority voices to be

included in every discussion of the public good. Those with education and experience, according to Mill, should be more willing to open up the process to diverse perspectives recognizing the importance of difference to good decision making. Mill believed that the interaction of difference in developing comprehensive policy could raise the morality of society and its institutions.

A constitutive role in society would give policy making and implementing institutions the responsibility to consider the broader, longer term meanings of social actions and also contribute to forming society according to higher values than simply meeting economic driven ends. In effect, public institutions are responsible for civic education, for examining the goals and consequences of public decisions and for raising the levels of virtue and integrity in society. Mill believed that government should promote the advancement of the community in socially responsible ways and with a long term, comprehensive focus on the public good. Public institutions are more than tools, they constitute, or build society (Cook, 1996).

Mill believed that this constitutive role gave institutions the responsibility to ensure the best management of public affairs in order to further the moral

and intellectual improvement of the state. The most effective way to improve the people is by doing the "direct work" well. The direct work is the work done by public administration. Badly constructed "machinery" doing public business poorly lowers morality, deadens intelligence, and lessens the activity of the people in their government. The history of public administration in the United States has been one of reform based on recognizing the importance of doing the direct work well. Mill recognized that bureaucracy must perform both its instrumental and constitutive roles well to fulfill its trust.

Cook (1996) argued that bureaucracy played a formative role in social relationships among citizens and between citizens and government that influenced the process of determining the public good. Public administration is constitutive and educative because it can lead to either positive or negative attitudes and relationships between the citizens and the government. It does this through its various types of daily interactions with citizens (the creation of social institutions). Good administration, good "machinery", encourages citizen commitment while administration lacking good organizational and management

principles applied to the public good undermines citizen commitment.

Mill's good machinery, or good organization and management, included tests for selecting the best officers, rules for promotion, appropriate provisions for order and convenient transaction of business, good record keeping, proper measures for responsibility and accountability and, "the best contrived checks against negligence, favoritism, or jobbery in any of the acts of the department" (1958, 26). But, Mill pointed out that the best machinery would have little benefit for the improvement of the people "if the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check, and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too passive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part" (1958, 27).

The representatives of the people were to publicize government work, facilitate public discourse, watch, check, and give or withhold their consent to the work of the governors. But the machinery, the actual governing, had to be made up of experience, skill, good organizational and management principles, accountability and responsibility, or no power of checking would be sufficient. Mill found it

equally necessary that the checking power must be responsible and accountable or it would not serve to improve the people. The best government would take advantage of the good qualities of the people and the competencies already existing in the state and make them instrumental in the organization of their institutions.

The key to the value of Mill's theory was in its wholeness and balance. The people, the representatives of the people, and the actual governors are inextricably joined and responsible for good government. All must perform their duties and responsibilities to the best of their ability. All must understand their important role in government; what they could do well, and what they should have done by others. This political relationship, characterized as constitutional morality, is the foundation for the uniqueness and importance of Mill's theory of government to American public administration. Mill structured a somewhat antagonistic relationship, but, one, he believed would create a dynamic that would move the state toward improvement while maintaining its stability and popular control. Mill's theory of governance gave an important role to bureaucracy; the actual governing of the

state and the balance and care of stability and long term vision.

Politics-Administration Dichotomy

Mill's theory of government did not set up a strict dichotomy between politics and administration. Public administration had an important role in the political process. However, there was a clear demarcation between what elected representatives and bureaucrats were supposed to do. Mill separated functions to take advantage of the special contributions each subset could make and to create a checking and balancing mechanism to control the potential power abuses. Within a system of constitutional morality, each subset performed a valuable function within the political whole.

There has been much argument over whether the politics-administration dichotomy is still an issue for current public administration, but it continues to appear in discussions of the role of public administration. Wamsley (1990) explained that at the highest level of abstraction there is no dichotomy since public administration is an obviously integral part of the governance process. Still, he continued, there is a

distinction between ruling and governing. Mill defined bureaucracy as the work of government and referred to it as the machinery that performs the direct work. He also called the bureaucrats the actual governors. But, ruling, the sovereign power, was in the hands of the people and their representatives. Clearly, Mill separated the functions of ruling and governing. The work of the actual governors needed to be filtered through the political system where the people could give final consent. Still, the people would be unable to make informed decisions without the experience and knowledge of the bureaucracy.

Some typologies created to describe the potential roles for bureaucrats begin by confusing the separation of politics and administration with the policy making process (Marini, 1994). Mill does not remove bureaucracy from the policy making process but makes it an integral part of that process. Removing bureaucracy from the policy making process serves to remove technical and substantive information that is critical to good policy decisions. Mill believed that elected representatives would not have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the bureaucracy (including policy implementation procedures, facts, experience, results, effects on citizens, program

evaluations) and therefore, should call on public administration to be involved at the beginning of the policy process.

The subject of the dichotomy was originally raised in an attempt to curb corruption and the influence of special interests in bureaucracy. It did not necessarily mean that bureaucracy should not be involved in the political process but that the administrative contribution to the policy process could be made in a non-partisan way (Marini, 1994). Separating the work of actual governance from the work of ruling helped governance, in Mill's theory, to be seen as an apolitical instrument. Bureaucracy was not neutral in the sense of value-free, but could strive to be neutral in the sense of partisan politics. Mill did not separate bureaucracy from the political process, but included it as an institution of experience, skill, and knowledge, with values defined more properly as those of the public good.

Box (1998) determined that governance should bring together "the entire range of activities of citizens, elected representatives, and public professionals" to create and implement policy (2). The creation of public policy brings people together to form a process that

determines the collective will. Separating public administration from the public policy process eliminates important information that is needed to create policy that acknowledges the complexities of long-term social issues and that fits with previous policy and previous determinations of the public interest. Public administration possesses a distinctive competence that is necessary to the governance process (Morgan, 1990).

However, no single part of government can possess all the information required to make good decisions (Spicer, 1995). Practical knowledge, scientific knowledge, a philosophical understanding of the public good, institutional knowledge, and opinions based on subjective, spiritual, and emotional preferences are all important to making public decisions. Diverse knowledge resources and understandings do not exist in a simple form ready for use by government officials (Spicer, 1995) but, they can come together in forums of public deliberation.

Public Deliberation

Mill made several arguments for the inclusion of various voices and opinions in determining the public interest. Mill especially advocated for frequent public

discussion of ideas and opinions that would contribute to good government by educating citizens as well as broadening the discussion. Mill believed there were limitations to what individuals or groups could know for certain. "Men and governments, must act to the best of their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty" (1961a, 271). When diverse voices and opinions are included in deliberations, Mill thought they would have a better chance of making good decisions. However, these must always be tentative decisions based on the limited knowledge available at that time.

Similarly, some public administration theorists criticize the quest for the right choice, the correct answer, or the device of certainty as a questionable and dangerous path to avoid wrong action (King & Stivers, 1998; McSwite, 1997; Wamsley, et.al., 1990). Mill believed that absolute certainty limited the scope of possibilities. McSwite (1997) explained that we may not reach certainty but we can build shared meanings through processes of human interaction. This interaction can build a basis for action.

Giving voice to all opinions in open forum, according to Mill, allows conflicting opinions to benefit

from increased knowledge by taking other opinions into account. He believed that in public deliberation the wisest could learn from the average person. Genius and originality can learn from those who prefer stability and maintenance. Mill called people together to listen, learn, and grow in an environment of public collaboration and cooperation similar to writers such as King and Stivers (1998) and Fox and Miller (1995) who argue for improved public discourse.

Mill believed that choosing the best in society to lead, separation of functions according to ability, and inclusion of diverse voices would contribute to the best public discourse and subsequent decision making. Diverse opinions find a place in the political system through constitutional checks on power (Spicer, 1995). The checks and balances of the system limit the ability of particular groups or leaders to impose their will on others without a process of dialogue. Constitutional limitations contribute to the control of majoritarian tyranny over diversity (Burke, 1986). Guarantees of equal treatment and consideration empower public administrators to question elected officials when they, at the very least, overlook the effects of their actions on a minority interest, and at

the extreme, when they abuse their power in sinister ways (Spicer & Terry, 1993; Burke, 1986).

Bureaucracy, the work of the government, according to Mill, played a large role in the progress of the state and the improvement of the people. Its qualities of stability, skill, knowledge, and experience help to mediate the passion and impulse of democratic decision making (Cook, 1996). That democratic passion and impulse concerned Mill because of the ability of the masses to enact majority tyranny on the minority. Green and Hubbell (1996) explained that the American system was designed to check and balance the "effects of wrongheaded public opinion" and "to provide diverse and stable sources of insight for public decisions" (47). Similarly, administrative law, bureaucratic rules and procedures reduce the ability of public administration to abuse their power by treating citizens arbitrarily (Spicer and Terry, 1993). The constitution is mainly concerned with limiting power for the prevention of tyranny (Marini, 1994; Spicer and Terry, 1993).

Mill's theory is based on his belief in the importance of the individual in a relationship with others that is regulated by a constitution, rule of law and

popular representation. But, Mill's constitutional morality, as system of ethics in addition to the law, contributes to the development of trust and respect among the subsets of the political system. A collaborative effort to determine the public good through public discourse and deliberation institutionalizes that trust (Ruscio, 1996). Civic education takes place in the process orienting citizens and public officials toward reconciling differences, separating real situations from emotional demands, and focusing on the good of the whole. Possibly more important, the public discourse process leads citizens to form networks and learn to trust each other, coming to understand their interdependence (Ruscio, 1996). This trust and cooperation between citizens creates social capital. Social capital is the basis of relationship and trust which creates a civil society rich in networks of citizen relationships (Putnam, 1993). Civil society is a strong social institution where the most important social changes can take place. Civil society, regulated by constitutional morality, valuing inclusion, creates wholeness and balance in social institutions.

Democracy, Representation, And Bureaucracy

The relationship Mill structured among the subsets of his polity is one of the reasons why his theory is sometimes called anti-democratic or elitist. By combining participation and competence and giving a greater role to competence than do pure forms of democracy, it looks as though the sovereignty of the people is limited. However, Mill said, "there is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community" (1958, 42). Popular government goes farther than any other form of government to educate the people. But, "the best form of a popular constitution" combines "complete popular control over public affairs with the greatest attainable perfection of skilled agency" (1957a, 170). The ideal government works out this balance in practice, through the relationship of constitutional morality.

Mill is sometimes quoted in arguments for democracy but Burke (1994) explained that Mill is more consistently described as a liberal rather than a democrat. Mill was most interested in protecting the rights of the individual to self-improvement and uniqueness, creating a society of

diversity that would lead to the improvement of the whole. Burke criticized Mill's utilitarian focus on the individual. He believed that Mill should have recognized the role democracy could play in facilitating individual and societal improvement. Mill did accept the radical democratic philosophy embraced by Jeremy Bentham and the early Utilitarians until his mental and emotional transformation. After years of experience and study, Mill developed a more complex view of the benefits and dangers of democracy, a view that Burke (1994) rightly describes as giving citizenship priority over democracy. Mill did recognize the role popular government could play in the life of the individual and society, but he also recognized that democracy, as a form of popular government, had some limitations in its pure form.

Mill's concerns about democracy included its tendency toward mediocrity as a form of government, the tendency for the majority to enact tyranny over the minority, and the loss of individuality and diversity. The problem of mediocrity stemmed from the value of equality that treated every opinion as worthy as the next with no reverence for competence. Burke (1994) said that generally, those on all sides of the democratic question

have come to recognize that governing requires some sort of "fitness" (57). It is not anti-democratic to insist that the best qualified lead. As Mill pointed out, self-government is not government of each by him or herself, but of each by all the rest. Most people would prefer that leaders have the highest skills and qualifications. Theories of public administration such as the Blacksburg's "refounding" (1990) and Terry's conservatorship (1995) recognize that a special competence is needed to do the work of government. Competence mediates and enhances popular decision making.

Mill believed that without some restraint on the majority including a process that gave voice to minority opinions, "the people" could oppress a portion of themselves. Spicer (1995) explained that coalitions of people could easily advance their own objectives to the detriment of others where there is unrestrained majority rule. Elected leaders with sinister interests could use their discretion to support these coalitions in order to secure their re-election. Majority rule is a check on government power but, as Spicer clarified, this does not entitle the majority to do as they please when it oppresses or overlooks the needs of others.

Individuality and diversity were important components of social progress to Mill. Moral and intellectual advancement only took place with the influx of new ideas and unique personalities. Equality and majority rule removed much of the difference and, in fact, required some sameness for cooperation. McSwite (1997) claimed that "democracy demands that people be regarded without respect to race, gender, religion, ethnicity, age, and so forth, without regard to anything that concretely confers an identity on them" (274). The exclusion of identity denied difference and defined citizenship in limited ways. Stivers (1996) was critical of the way citizenship has been defined in the past, excluding certain groups. The confinement of some groups to private and unequal spaces has skewed the expectations of the role of citizens.

Mill, even in 1861, was adamant about inclusion of women as equals to men and critical of slavery in the United States. He recognized the contradiction in the "democratic" claims of the United States when they limited those who could be given full citizen's rights. Mill recognized and valued difference, leading him to support the concept of equity and move away from valuing equality as sameness. McSwite (1997) argued that democracy, in an

attempt to fulfill its value of equality, tended to remove differences among people viewing others as blanks. Without these differences, society would stagnate. Citizenship, to Mill, was a formative institution for the people in a society. The roles and responsibilities of citizenship served both to enlarge the views of the individual so that he or she could consider the interests of the whole and to give the individual opportunities for personal growth. Active citizenship, then, by diverse voices built a richer society.

Democracy, equality, and majority rule have paradoxical effects on society. Current public administration theorists take different approaches to the concept of democracy. Burke (1989) explained that theories and arguments about American democracy can be divided into three general approaches: 1) the minimalist, 2) the constitutional, and 3) the democratic process based approach (182). The difference in these approaches is the degree to which they rely on popular consent. Marini (1994) argued that in spite of American patriotism that is grounded in democratic reverence, American values are more accurately described as liberal, republican, and constitutional.

Cook (1996) admitted that it has been unacceptable for some time to suggest that democracy needed to be "reined in" (145). Recognizing that the people may make decisions based on immediate desires and overlook their long-term interests has been criticized as elitism. Cook argued that democracy has a tendency toward demagoguery. Adding the qualifiers of "liberal," "constitutional," or "republican" limits the dangers of democracy. Liberal, constitutional, democracies value popular consent but also respect individual choice and autonomy through rule of law, due process, and equal protection (Burke, 1986). Mill tried to compensate for the dangers of democracy with a constitutional, representative government, placing value on the role of competence in mediating public opinion.

Cook (1996) found representation to be the most basic constitutive element in a liberal democratic system. Citizens make choices in elections about who they are collectively; as a political whole. Elections facilitate and construct the citizen's identity and membership in the polity. Mill saw elections as a public trust where citizens were to act responsibly. He took voting so seriously that he thought voting should take place

publicly, in front of their fellow citizens, where reasons had to be given for choices rather than by a secret ballot. Secret ballots tended to give citizens the impression that the vote was to benefit themselves rather than the interests of the community. Similarly, King and Stivers (1998) argued that the advent of the Australian secret ballot effected the publicness of citizenship by making voting a private experience, secluded in a private booth. Contrary to criticisms that voting is passive and removed from the political experience, voting is an active part of citizenship that carries responsibility.

Choosing the best among themselves to act as representatives that will lead the policy making process could be one of the most important acts of a citizen, but it has been recently criticized. Hummel and Stivers (1998) argue that representation creates a "knowledge gap" between citizens and government. This knowledge gap results in laws that are based on abstract representations of individual people rather than on real-life experience. Hummel and Stivers ask how a representative can know the ordinary people and their direct life experiences?

Cook (1996) found representation to be constitutive as it transforms and enlarges public views from the

individual good to the public good. Laws reflect the good of the collective while protecting the individual from abuse of power from others. Elections of representatives reaffirm the consent of the people to their government. Whether the representative can know the "ordinary people" and whether or not the representative should respond to their direct life experiences is a question of choosing between a delegate and a trustee role for the representative.

Mill clearly chose the trustee role for representatives similarly to Edmund Burke (Haque and Spicer, 1997). Mill believed that citizens should choose the best among themselves to rule, and having chosen, they should allow them to use their abilities to make decisions in the public interest. Mill's constitutional morality bounded a relationship of trust that encouraged citizens to interfere only when public officials betrayed that trust.

Mill's constitutional morality extended to bureaucracy. The representatives must watch, publicize, check, give unlimited latitude of suggestion and criticism, and finally apply or withhold the nation's assent to the work of bureaucracy, but otherwise they should not interfere in the details of their work. Mill frequently

compared representative democracy with bureaucracy as forms of government. He recognized the dangers and limitations of bureaucracy as well as its benefits. He was equally mindful of the dangers and limitations of representative government. Working together, the two forms of government could be mutually corrective of their faults and dangers.

Mill explained that bureaucratic government had important advantages over representative government in skill, experience and practical knowledge (1958, 89). However, bureaucratic governments usually "die of routine". They do not encourage individuality and "energy of mind". Bureaucratic governments need the spirit of individuality and originality that is found in popular government (1958, 90). But, one cannot survive without the other. Mill believed that conflicting influences were necessary in all of human affairs in order to flourish. Pursuit of "one good object" apart from the other does not lead to excess of one, but the decay and loss of both good objects. Government by trained officials without an "outside element of freedom" will not be effective. And, freedom will not hold together without trained and skilled administration.

Mill tried to balance the pursuit: " it is one of the most important ends of political institutions to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other; to secure, as far as they can be made compatible, the great advantage of the conduct of affairs by skilled persons, bred to it as an intellectual profession, along with that of a general control vested in, and seriously exercised by, bodies representative of the entire people" (1958, 91). Working out, in practice, the line of separation between the work of government properly performed by skilled and experienced governors and the responsibility of watching and controlling the governors, guiding the relationship through an ethical system of constitutional morality, leads toward this balance.

Mill provided an example of how competence and participation could be integrated at the local level. Here we can see how Mill valued participation in local government for its role in civic education and how he recognized the role of skill and experience in maintaining social and cultural values that set the stage for valuable, usable public deliberation.

Participation And Competence At The Local Level

Mill recognized that municipal institutions were the principle instrument for the political education of the people. It was on the local level that Mill believed the lessons of popular government could be learned, maintained and preserved. This was confirmed for him by the work of Tocqueville when he observed that municipal institutions were the "very fountainhead of American democracy" (1961b, xv). Managing local interests diffuses intelligence and experience in considering joint concerns and can help to qualify people to manage and exercise power in national affairs. The local level was the "school" of civic virtue and public morality. But, he explained, no school can do its job without a knowledgeable and experienced teacher and equally, students cannot learn where the teacher finishes all the tasks (1958, 228). Mill used this analogy to caution both those who desired to all but eliminate government and also those who believed that because government could perform duties better than the people could, it should. Mill's ever-present sense of balance continued to be revealed as he discussed practical applications of his theory.

Mill said that local administration of business including elected office, administrative institutions, industrial and philanthropic enterprises, and voluntary associations were the chief instruments for the civic and moral education of the citizens (1961a, 355; 1958, 214). Here, citizens had the greatest opportunity to participate in government. In national as well as local government, responsible citizens are expected to serve on juries in the administration of justice, read newspapers to stay informed and write to them to practice their freedom of speech, attend public meetings to express their concerns and support and to check government officials, and use their ultimate power of sovereignty by voting. These responsibilities are securities for freedom and a means of general public education. But, Mill said, they are practice in thinking more than action.

On the local level, the average citizen has a better opportunity of being elected to political office or filling one of the many executive offices. The citizen can also join voluntary civic associations, work for policy issues, serve as a member of a board, or join with others to serve the poor. There are limitless possibilities for citizens, who are interested, to become involved in

activities that serve the public interest. Serving in these positions requires the citizen to act, think, and speak in the public interest rather than from a narrow personal focus. This experience on the local level provides the greatest political education that can be found for citizens. And, since the citizen serving in the local administration of business lives and works near his or her family and friends, this education has the greatest potential to be shared with others.

Mill believed that action was the best teacher. He divided mental excellence into three types: intellectual, practical and moral (1958, 47). Intellectual superiority is gained by active effort. "The test of real and vigorous thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming dreams, is successful application to practice" (1958, 48). Mill thought that learning by doing was the best practical experience. Forming new habits was the best teacher. On the local level, citizens had many opportunities to apply their thoughts and dreams to practice. Individuals and voluntary associations provide endless diversity of ideas and experiments in action. This application enabled local government to benefit from the diversity and individuality that Mill believed was

necessary to the growth and development of the people and to progress in society (1961, 355).

However, Mill believed that local government was particularly susceptible to "selfish mismanagement of local interests by a jobbing and local oligarchy" (1957a, 124). Still equally concerned with competence, Mill emphasized the benefits of centralization to the exercise of popular government at the local level. He warned that unreasonable jealousy of national government interference prevents the beneficial use of that authority in correcting the problems of local self-government.

An active central authority can be beneficial in advising and communicating information to local bodies as well as framing general rules for their operation. This activity can be an aid to local bodies and used as an instrument of educating the people (1961b, xx). A mixture of central and local management could combine the best of skilled and experienced supervision with popular participation. Mill said that though he may not have "drawn the line between them exactly in the right place" after serious study, he insisted on equal recognition of the evils in both local and national government and offered a means of reconciling the advantages of both.

A central authority would mainly perform two functions. First, the state should provide a central depository of information actively circulating the results of experiments and trials of various types in governments throughout the nation and from foreign countries. This would be a depository of competence, skill and experience. The information would, Mill believed, carry a kind of objectivity that would be free from local prejudices and the narrow views that result from local oligarchy and sinister or private interests. It would also contain a range of experience that localities could examine before wasting resources to make mistakes that others have already made. Bureaucrats from this central authority could advise and educate localities using this evidence (1961a, 355).

The second responsibility of the central authority would be to compel the local officers to obey laws laid down for their guidance. Here, the authority of the agency treads a thin line. Mill explained that in things not specifically provided for by general rules, the local officers should be left to their own judgment and discretion. But, where they violated rules approved by the representative body, they should be answerable to the law. Mill believed that there were matters that affected more

than simply the locality. A community had no moral right to mismanagement when the consequences could overflow into other communities. His example was the execution of poor laws, but one could imagine many seemingly local issues that if mismanaged could effect other communities (1961a, 360).

The central agency would be responsible to watch over the execution of the rules and then to report violations to the officers of law enforcement and to the constituencies who chose them. This activity, according to Mill, would be an aid to the education, motivation, and, development of individuals and communities. The line is crossed, the danger of a central authority begins, when the teacher "instead of informing, advising, and upon occasion, denouncing, makes them work in fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them" (1961a, 360). The educative process can not take place when the controls are too tight or when the perfection of the machinery takes precedence over the development of the people.

Mill considered how local business could be best carried out in such a way as to contribute to the development of the people. The principles of management and accountability on the local level should be the same as

those on the national level. It should be completely clear who is responsible for decisions and for hiring and removing functionaries. He added that it was "ridiculous" to elect professionals by popular vote. Surveyors, health officers, and tax collectors, for example, must be chosen for their skill and experience by those who have similar skill and experience. Local leaders, however, are more tempted to make political or private interest appointments so it is imperative that one individual can be held responsible for the persons they appoint (1958, 221).

Mill said it is obvious that purely local business should remain local. His examples include paving, lighting, and cleaning streets. The nation is only as interested in these functions as they are interested in the well being of individual citizens. But, there are many local functions that could be considered of equal national interest and should be liable to interference by the central government. His examples of these include prisons, the local police, and the local administration of justice. Maladministration in these areas can threaten the safety of other communities (1958, 222).

Mill pointed out that good management of these types of functions are the same everywhere (1958, 223).

The best minds in the nation should be used to develop principles, laws, and programs for managing these issues. Mill advocated the use of national regulating agencies to watch over the local administration of critical functions. Central agencies should inspect factories, schools, and the administration of welfare guidelines, sanitary regulation, and other functions that could suffer from mismanagement.

How far should local authorities be trusted with discretionary power? Mill expected that local officers would generally possess lower intelligence and knowledge than those in similar positions on the national level. The local public, who watches and checks their actions, would also be of lower intelligence than those who are more concerned with national affairs. The local press would be more concerned with reporting and inciting public discussion about the national issues since local issues would seem comparatively small (1958, 224).

But, Mill insisted, even though the local authorities and public may be inferior to the national equivalent, their direct interest in local affairs compensates for their lesser intelligence giving them, by far, the advantage in the details of their administration (1958, 225). The local public has the greatest opportunity

of watching the administration of local affairs. It is the local opinion that acts directly upon official conduct or calls attention to needed correction. The local bodies will generally have the advantage in the details of management, but in comprehension of the principles, even of local management, the national government will have the advantage.

While localities had a more direct interest in their own affairs, the national government had access to the greatest knowledge, skill, and experience. Local knowledge and experience reflects localized concerns and limited knowledge of possibilities. Mill asserted this general principle to combine the best of both local and national government: "The authority which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over principles, while that which is most competent in details should have the details left to it. Power may be localized, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralized" (1958, 226).

In accordance with this principle, Mill believed that every branch of the administration of local affairs should have a corresponding central agency to give advice, to compel recording and publicity of proceedings, and to

enforce adherence to laws set up by the national representatives. "The localities may be allowed to mismanage their own interests, but not to prejudice those of others, nor violate those principles of justice between one person and another" (1958, 226). It is the national government's duty to maintain strict observance of its protective function. Using an example Mill has been concerned with from the beginning, he explained that the local majority should not be allowed to oppress minorities or classes. In cases such as these, the national government would neglect its duty to protect its citizens if it did not interfere. The national government must interfere in details in order to protect the principle of participation (Thompson, 1976).

The question of the right line drawn between the function of the national government and the rights and responsibilities of the local government is complex and Mill did not set out any hard rules. The balance between centralization and decentralization must be worked out in practice in each community. More specifically, the balance may be dependent on the different kinds of local business. Still, he designed his local government to ensure various opportunities for citizen participation as the main

instrument of civic education. And, he tried to ensure that the most competent in the local community would have the most significant influence. These principles are evident throughout Mill's theory of government.

Mill emphasized that there were equal benefits and evils in both local and national government. He advocated a balance between these because competence in government is as necessary as popular participation. Mill said,

It is but a poor education that associates ignorance with ignorance and leaves them, if they care for knowledge, to grope their way to it without help, and to do without it if they do not. What is wanted is the means of making ignorance aware of itself and able to profit by knowledge, accustoming minds which know only routine to act upon and feel the value of principles, teaching them to compare different modes of action and learn by the use of their reason to distinguish the best (1958, 228).

The administration of local business was the school of civic virtue and public morality. But the school needed a teacher to guide the learning.

Recently, much of public administration literature has focused on the examination of the relationship between bureaucracy and popular government at the local level where the work of the actual governors most closely meets the life of the citizen. It is here that participation theorists find the most meaningful roles for citizens. Mill

agreed, but he continued to emphasize the need for the competence and institutional qualities of public administration, even at the local level.

Mill's integrative approach to government gave public administration a unique role as a central depository and distributor of information that is critical to good government. In this role, public administration acts as a constitutive, educative institution providing the knowledge citizens need to develop responsible opinions about the public good. In the next chapter, looking at Mill's model of government as an information system will illustrate the importance of Mill's work to bridging competence and participation and finding a role for public administration within popular government.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Mill's theory of bureaucracy within representative government addresses many of the current concerns of public administration theory as well as the enduring question of the role of bureaucracy within a popular government.

Mill's work addresses some of the concerns of the competence theorists by supporting the role of bureaucracy in maintaining cultural and social values by advocating for the long-term comprehensive interests of the public.

Mill's work addresses some of the concerns expressed by the participation theorists by supporting the need for citizens to have an integral part in self-government. While Mill does not address all of the concerns of each group, nor does he solve each of the problems, and would not support all of their assertions, Mill does provide a common ground for discussion.

Mill's theory combined competence and participation by focusing on the equally necessary roles of the citizen,

the representative and the administration in creating good government. Within the framework of competence and participation Mill emphasized the importance of an educated citizenry that could participate in identifying the common good. Recognizing that the common good was a complex and difficult concept to identify, Mill advocated the importance of public discourse that included diverse voices. It was in discussing and airing diverse view points that citizens would begin to enlarge their own perspective and learn to embrace the concept of public interest. Mill expected the representatives to facilitate public discourse and bureaucracy to provide the comprehensive information necessary to enlighten the discussion.

Fox and Miller (1995) recognized the need for moving toward an improved form of public discourse. They explained that there is, in effect, no public conversation taking place now that includes widespread and varied participation focused on the common good. Within representative democracy, the public interest is determined through a process of sovereign will formation. Fox and Miller determined that something more artificial and less authentic was taking place in public discussion.

Recently, deHaven-Smith (1998) questioned whether current efforts to improve political and bureaucratic institutions were missing the mark when the problem may actually fall on the inability of the public to participate in the process of collective will formation. The mass public, according to deHaven-Smith, is politically fragmented and lacks a process for collective discourse. Like Mill, deHaven-Smith recognized the role of government in civic education. Government is responsible for creating the opportunity for citizens to take part in informed and responsible public deliberation.

The state of citizenship in the United States has been a common concern in recent literature. Definitions of citizenship include words like "obligation" and "responsibility" (Cooper & Yoder, 1999; Zanetti & Carr, 1999; Stivers, 1990). But, citizenship today seems to be more focused on rights and protections rather than the role the citizen should play in the community (Zanetti & Carr, 1999). Informed and responsible public deliberation cannot take place where citizens are not fulfilling their role.

Recognizing the need for civic education, citizen action groups like Common Cause and Project Vote Smart have taken advantage of information technology to spread issue

information in an attempt to educate citizens. Local governments have instituted variations on town meetings and tried to improve access to government decision making to encourage citizens to become more active. Public administration theorists and practitioners have looked at ways to repair the relationship between government and citizens exploring methods for linking citizens to public processes in meaningful ways (Liep, 1999; Simo, 1999; Clapp, Imig, & Reilly, 1999; Kass, 1999; Keying, 1999; Morgan and Vizzini, 1999; Melkers and Thomas, 1998; King, Felty, Susel, 1998; King, Stivers, and Collaborators, 1998; Box, 1998). In all these attempts, public administration is seen as an important contributor to the political process and administrators have a special role in preserving and advancing popular government. These writers combine the concepts of competence and participation in their prescriptions and observations.

Competence and participation also come together within the process of public discourse. Here, ideally, all subsets of the polity interact together to determine the public good. Citizens have a responsibility or obligation, not only to participate, but to participate in the public

interest. In order to fulfill this responsibility they must be supplied with accurate and meaningful information.

Mill's work gives public administration an important role in public discourse. He recognized public administration as a critical component of the political system within the policy making process. From Mill's writing we can devise a model of government that defines the roles of equally necessary subsets of government. Mill believed that government had the ability and responsibility to educate citizens and help them develop larger interests. Good administration, the direct work of government, more than other component of government, encouraged citizen commitment (1958).



This model helps to bridge and integrate the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government by defining the special role of bureaucracy as a central depository and distributor of critical information that is necessary for popular government. With Mill's work, competence and participation or bureaucracy and popular government can live together. His work provides a normative base to guide further discussion of public administration theory toward more stable and positive grounding within popular government.

Mill's Integrative Model Of Government

In its role as a constitutive, educative institution, public bureaucracy has a primary position in Mill's first criteria of good government: to improve the qualities of the citizens. Public administration's unique position as a central depository and distributor of information means it has the tools to teach citizens to compare different modes of action and learn by the use of this information to distinguish the better choices. Publicity of public information protects the rights of citizens and also facilitates civic education by allowing observation and criticism and opening up the opportunity to exercise the liberty of public discussion (1958, 26).

Mill's integrative approach to government gives bureaucracy a primary position as an educator in an information system (Figure 1). In this position, bureaucracy gathers information from several sources that include the impact of public policy on citizens, constitutional law, previous policy and determinations of the public good and political demands of representatives. Bureaucracy then synthesizes information from all these sources into implementation processes. The synthesis takes

Mill's Integrated Model of Government:
An Information System



Flow of Information
(Figure 1)

place in the combination and analysis of direct experience and expert knowledge.

Next, bureaucracy presents information back to political representatives and citizens so that they can make informed evaluations and decisions about past, present, and future policy. Bureaucracy has the unique ability to perform this education and information service because its members are engaged in doing the "work of government." In this integrated information system model, each group has unique information sources to share and integrate with other groups (Table 2).

Mill's integrative model relies on citizens to be the "mainspring" of the whole system. The citizen's responsibilities include performing their public trust by taking part in public deliberation to determine the public good, exercising their responsibility of voting, and ensuring the integrity of the system by expecting and giving latitude to their representatives to act as trustees in "refining and enlarging the public interest". In order to perform their duties well, citizens need information. Citizens are also givers and receivers of information.

The citizen group as a whole can be divided into many subgroups. Citizens have many associations and

networks in which they exchange information, deliberate issues, and refine and enlarge their own opinions. Within citizen groups are opinion leaders, or those who are

(Table 2) Information System Model
Sources of Information

<u>CITIZENS</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVES</u>	<u>BUREAUCRACY</u>
• Politicized Information	• Politicized Information	• Politicized Information
• Citizen Networks	• Constituents	• History
• Opinion Leaders	• Interest Groups	• Law
• Personal Experience	• Lobbyists	• Admin. Experience
	• Deliberation Among Colleagues	• Skill
	• Bureaucracy	• Expert Knowledge
		• Knowledge of Citizen Impact

respected for their knowledge and expertise in certain areas. Opinion leaders influence others, molding public opinion and developing concepts of the public good. These concepts are then expressed to the representatives in both specific and general terms. Individual citizens may contact their representatives to express their personal opinion

based on their experience or based on their assessment of discussions that take place within their associations.

A survey by the PEW research center found that when citizens had specific or experiential information about government policies and programs, their attitudes toward government tended to improve (1997). But, general opinions about how well government runs programs raised negative ratings.

The citizens are also impacted by politicized information from the representatives. This politicized information will be the result of several sources of information. Representatives are influenced by lobbyists who hope to make their case within the political system. The general and specific opinion of their constituents in localities contributes to the development of the representatives' political position. Representatives also receive information from the bureaucracy that is largely experiential and expert. This information is the synthesis of policy, law, history, special knowledge and actual experience. Then, representatives receive information during deliberation with their colleagues in the assembly that enlarges and refines their views. This combined

information is shared with the citizens in political forums to determine the public good.

The representatives are the main decision making body. It is here that components of the public good are determined based on the process of public information gathering, sharing and deliberations. This information is then given to the bureaucracy for implementation. The bureaucracy is a giver and receiver of information, but carries a unique responsibility to collect and synthesize information to be used by the other groups. Bureaucracy is an institution of centralized knowledge that can be utilized for informed decision making. Bureaucracy impacts citizens by its implementation of policy and collects information from citizens about those impacts.

Bureaucracy collects two types of information. One type is information about the common good (e.g. the national economy) and the other is information about the good of specific groups (e.g. welfare recipients or the elderly). Bureaucracy shares this information in two ways. They share the information with the representatives in the policy decision making process to contribute specialized knowledge and expertise that the representative would not have from simply political or partisan sources. They also

share information with citizens and citizen groups so that they can develop informed opinions about the common good.

Bureaucracy does not have decision making authority to determine the public good or the intent of public policy. The decision making authority lies with the representatives of the people who are accountable through the electoral system where consent is affirmed. However, bureaucracy holds the most important information needed to determine the public good. The synthesis of specialized information takes place in the work of the bureaucracy and does not take place anywhere else in the model. The bureaucracy combines political information, legal information, practical and experiential information about public policy. It synthesizes these sources of knowledge with the interests and concerns of the citizens whose lives it impacts.

The role of the bureaucracy then, is not to finally determine the public good nor to respond to individuals or citizen group demands to change policy or direct policy outcomes toward their personal benefit. The role of bureaucracy is to use the information received from these sources to inform both citizens and representatives of the

practical impact of their decisions, and to implement policies determined in the political process in ways that fulfill the public good in both abstract and specific ways.

Bureaucracy holds the special responsibility of maintaining public integrity by connecting policies and processes with historical precedence and intellectual and social change. In this way, bureaucracy is the main institutional embodiment of social norms and culture. It is the body that is most constitutive and educative within the system. It holds the institutional memory and competence of society. Public bureaucracy is "adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist and make them instrumental to the right purposes" (1958, 25). Its members include many of society's expert and skilled people. Bureaucracy's street-level workers interact with individual citizens and citizen groups in ways that representatives do not, in fact, in ways that no other social institution can or does. Bureaucracy's special public trust is the maintenance, synthesis and use of society's knowledge to create and recreate the public good through the work of government. The bureaucracy, then, holds the experience up for the

people and their representatives for evaluation and consent.

Citizens may have little access or little usable access to practical information from the public bureaucracy. In many cases, the information may be available, but citizens have little motivation to use it. If there is a problem with sovereign will formation, this may be where the system currently breaks down. The political fragmentation of citizen interests and the concerns around social attachment and trust in government (deHaven-Smith, 1998) may lie in the kind of and amount of knowledge citizens receive and use to develop their opinions about the public good. The PEW survey supports this notion (1997). Distrust of government increases when citizens do not have specific information to develop their opinions.

Currently, citizens are bombarded with partisan opinion and not given the resources or means to separate the information and make sense of it in ways that would lead them to develop opinions that reflect the larger public interest. Without the means to gather and process critical information it is difficult for them to fulfill their public trust.

In this environment citizens have limited ways to judge whether their representative is doing the job well. They may feel frustrated about the limited power they have over government. Personal interests seem easier to determine and they feel threatened in ways that lead them to fighting for themselves rather than the good of the whole.

The PEW survey found that distrust of government is diminishing as compared to previous surveys, but close to 70% of the American population still do not trust government (1997). However, an important finding was that citizens place their distrust in elected officials more than in civil servants. Public administration may be in a unique position to improve opinion toward government, to contribute to increased trust, civic virtue, and improved public discourse in the common interest.

Mill saw citizens as the "mainspring" of the whole system. They needed good, usable information to perform their public trust well. But, Mill believed that exercising the public trust was so important that those who cared so little that they did not apply themselves to the study and understanding of the public interest should not be forced to participate. Having a voice in government is

an instrument of training and education. When taken seriously, it fosters patriotism, civic education, and a sense of public duty in the citizenry (1963, 33). Indifference to participation robs the interested citizen of the power of his or her voice. Self-government, according to Mill, was not government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest (1961a, 257). Mill was concerned that a vote from a person who did not take the public trust seriously would minimize the vote of a person who had strong convictions.

Mill believed that good government resulted from the combination of interested citizens participating in their government and government whose first priority was the civic education of citizens (1958, 25). Good government can not exist without virtuous and intelligent people exercising their public trust. Good government is not the responsibility of one or the other subset of government, but is the responsibility of the whole. When there is widespread distrust of government the whole system must be examined. Mill's model of government addresses the whole political system.

Based on current literature and using Mill's model we could infer that current negative attitudes toward

government are connected to the inability or the unwillingness to access and process the special information available from the public bureaucracy. Thus, the relationship between the citizens and the representatives breaks down because they are unable to work together to determine the public good. Citizens lack the knowledge and understanding they need to develop opinions of the public good. The citizens, then, feeling this inadequacy, choose and re-elect representatives for the wrong reasons. Lacking civic education and good information they evaluate government based on their personal needs and desires.

Representatives, consequently, feel no mandate from the citizens as a whole, but they do feel pressure from organized special interests. Their duty to make policy decisions in the public interest is not fulfilled when they are limited by partisan pressure from special interests. Citizens and representatives are not defining the public good together, and have, in many cases, become competing interests. It is understandable, then, that some would call this the "dark side of representation" (Hummel and Stivers, 1998).

Public bureaucracy, in this environment, becomes the target of antagonistic criticism because policy

implementation does not seem to address either the public good or the good of individuals, but represents incremental attempts to fulfill the disjointed public policy mandates they are given (Hummel & Stivers, 1998; Wamsley & Wolf, 1996). Past attempts to include citizens in government are criticized as being superficial. Citizens believe they are brought in to approve decisions already made (King, Felty, & Susel, 1997). There is no whole, balanced public picture of the path to public interest, only competing interests that never seem to find common ground. When measured against the ever-changing opinion of the day, or of the most powerful or noisy group of the day, it is easy to see why bureaucracy looks as if it is a jumble of reactions that represent no one.

Mill's criteria of good government gave government the responsibility to improve the qualities of the citizens, educating them to move away from a narrow self-focus to an understanding of the public good. To do this, government was responsible to take advantage of the good qualities that already exist in society and make them instrumental to this purpose. The most important role of government is "to promote the virtue and intelligence of the public themselves" (1958, 25). In order to have good

government, virtuous and intelligent people must make up the community.

This reciprocal relationship depends on recognizing the important role of public administration as a critical information system. Understanding public administration's role in constituting political society will go a long way to ameliorate our political and social problems. The key is to share bureaucracy's practical, experiential, expert knowledge in usable ways with citizens so that they are not limited to politicized information on a policy issue, but have access to a practical knowledge base with which to weigh the political information they receive.

This is the basic idea of Hummel and Stiver's democratic knowledge (1998). It embodies Fox and Miller's authenticity of speech (1995). Citizen opinions are still filtered through the political system, but they will be better informed, better educated, and consequently, have more influence over their representatives and better knowledge base with which to judge their performance. Public administrators are responsible for sharing the experience and knowledge they have collected and monitoring the public deliberation process for its adherence to comprehensive, long-term, political and social values. In

the public deliberation process, diverse voices give depth and creativity to policy making.

Mill's theory combines the main philosophy of competence theories with the main philosophy of participation theories. His theory gives the citizens "real" responsibility for checking and informing government. It allows them to define themselves in publicly collective ways. It demands that citizens act responsibly with their public trust. It also gives government the responsibility of facilitating responsible citizen behavior through education and maintenance of quality "machinery". The whole system is regulated by constitutional morality, an ethical system of public trust and responsibility, where publicity and information sharing enable one group to check and balance the next.

Limitations Of Mill's Theory To American Government

Mill's theory has much to offer public administration theory discussion. It can be a useful and usable framework to bridge the concepts of bureaucracy and popular government. It is important, however, to recognize that Mill's work has some limitations. For example, Mill acknowledged that his work was an ideal type. He believed

that government had to be structured to benefit the people as they currently were or as they soon could become. In that way, Mill's work should not be applied to all governments, regardless of their particular social and cultural characteristics. Mill's work also carried a normative tone, advocating for popular government as the best possible type of government. Within his normative prescriptions, Mill suggested certain concepts that would not be acceptable in American government.

Mill was writing for Britain, at a time when democracy was experiencing many growing pains, and before a system of public education was established. These things led to Mill's concerns about the qualifications of the people to run government. Experiences in France in this same time frame led many advocates of popular government to question the potential of rule by the people.

Mill's reliance on competence would alarm some. It is difficult to imagine that the United States would adopt Mill's concept of plurality of votes given to those who have advanced qualifications. There is little chance that the American political system would be modified to give law-making responsibilities to a legislative bureaucracy. Americans would have difficulty modifying the concept of

equality and recognizing the complications of the term, but equality in political processes may be better defined as equality under the law rather than assuming that every opinion is equal to another. Qualifications of interest and knowledge can make opinions unequal.

In general Mill's writing has some limited application because it was written for a specific time and place, 138 years ago. Still, he grappled with the same questions that are important today. As I have argued in this study, Mill's work has remarkable resemblance to current issues in American government. One writer said, in 1961, that Mill "is as fresh as tomorrow morning's newspaper and as relevant as the latest publicized crisis of our time" (vii). That is still true in 1999.

Mill has been categorized as a rationalist (Spicer, 1995) and was also very much caught up in modernism which places him in ontological and epistemological contradiction to some current theories within public administration. He was interested in the potential of science and had several written exchanges with Comte (1957a). Many of his ideas about expertise and competence would be difficult for some theorists to entertain, even for purposes of discussion.

Topics For Further Study

Further limitations of the study concern topics that I have not addressed, but could be covered with subsequent research. Specific benefits of Mill's work to issues of postmodernism found in the literature could make an interesting contribution to the comprehensiveness of Mill's work for American public administration. His interest in diversity of voices and the necessary antagonism of interests in creating new ideas and expanding the boundaries of knowledge may have some application to the use of quantum and chaos theories in organizations.

Mill's concern about diversity in government processes leads to some questions about whether or not he would support the concept of representative bureaucracy. Diverse interests can be represented in the work of government on all levels. The policy implications in the work of diverse street-level bureaucrats would add to the discussion about the dissemination of practical information in public deliberation.

Given Mill's concerns about equality, further inquiry into the differences between equality and equity may be informative to this framework and to issues of direct participation. Do all citizens have the ability to

participate, even with the improved information system and public deliberation processes? Are advocates necessary for certain groups? Are minorities and other dispossessed groups better served through the political system or by directly infiltrating bureaucracy?

Mill would not agree with Rohr's characterization of bureaucracy as a fourth branch of government with authority to pick and choose which higher authority to follow. But, Rohr's discussion of the bureaucracy fulfilling some of the roles of the Senate as originally conceived would lead to further discussion about some of Mill's thoughts on representation.

Mill's theory of government was concerned the effect of democracy on the future of governments in general. Although he used examples from the United States and evaluated the American "experiment" his main focus was on British government. Some consideration should be given to the role of the President and the Judicial branch of American government. Similarly, Mill did not believe a second house was necessary in terms of the British model of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. This study of Mill's work has considered representation as a whole, without dealing with differences in the Senate and

Congress. Further study in these areas would contribute to the comprehensive application of Mill's work to American government.

Accepting Mill's model and the implications I have drawn would provide impetus for further research into technological methods of informing and educating citizens. While some may view information access through the Internet as an elitist privilege, investment in expanding the information highway can be seen as a public good, democratizing information. I do not assume that information coming out of the bureaucracy would be wholly neutral, objective, and factual. But, the information would be based on practical experience and different than information available from any other source. Its institutional perspective combines past and present experience with long-term, comprehensive outlooks on society and culture.

Mill's theory contributed a unique opportunity for the development of a comprehensive, balanced, and integrated theory of American public administration within popular government. Mill critically examined democracy as a form of popular government and found it necessary to limit its dangers. He chose representative government,

properly administered, as the ideal form of government both in practice and in theory. He developed a system of governing elites that would contribute competence to government while including citizens as its "mainspring".

Mill structured competence and participation within an ethical system of constitutional morality, allowing and requiring each subset of government to perform their public trust using their unique abilities in an environment of mutual respect, interfering in each other's specific tasks only when that trust is betrayed.

Mill's work provided a bridge for discussion among current streams of public administration theory and suggests an integrated and balanced, normative model of public administration within a constitutive and educative information system. Based on this study, I believe Mill's work is relevant and informative to current public administration theory and should be used as a framework for discussion.

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